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Anticipating Accommodation
Jennifer Bennett Shinall'
ABSTRACT: In theory, a reasonable accommodation mandate can remedy
worker marginalizationby requiringemployers to make small adjustments in
the workplace that have bigpayoffs for employees. But in reality, a reasonable
accommodation mandate may be an empty promise. Reasonable
accommodation is the hallmarkfeature of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
("ADA "), yet decades of empiricalstudies indicate that wage and employment
outcomes of disabled individuals have not improved-and may have even
worsened-since the Act's passage. Economists have been quick to blame the
reasonable accommodation mandate for the ADA's failure, but they have
lacked sufficient data to discern both what aspect of the mandate is
problematic and how to improve it.
This Article is the first to supply the missing data, using two experimental
vignette studies that test decisionmakers' willingness to accommodate job
candidates and existing employees. The studiesfind that decisionmakers are
more reluctant to accommodate job candidates than existing employees, and
cost concerns drive much of this reluctance. Based on these findings, the
Article argues that much of the ADA's ineffectiveness stemsfrom the ambiguity
it creates with respect to the reasonableaccommodationsdisabled workers may
require. Employers have little information about job candidates, making it
difficult to estimate the costs of accommodating a candidate with any
accuracy; accommodatingan existing employee is inherently less ambiguous
because employers have prior experience with that worker. As a result,
employers exhibit far more aversion towards accommodating disabled job
candidates than disabled existing employees.
Because the current structure of the ADA only increases this ambiguity,
particularly at the hiring stage, the Article proposes a twofold reform that
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promotes clarity in employers' obligations to accommodate: cost caps to limit
what an employer must spend to accommodate a given employee and the
extension of governmental disability benefits to cover accommodation costs
that exceed those caps. These alterations to the ADA will help reasonable
accommodation achieve its theoretical promise, not only for workers with
disabilities, but also for others disadvantaged by traditionally inflexible
working environments, to whom the reasonable accommodation model may
one day be extended.
1.

INTRO DU CTIO N ..........................................................
623

II.

THE STATE OF DIsABI

A.

B.

IN THE WORKPLACE ............................
628

.............................
628
TiiE AMBIG;UrJ oF DISABILITY .......................................
634
1. Ambiguity Aversion in Theory ..................................
634
2. Ambiguity Aversion in Practice ..................................
637

ASSESSING TIlE PERFORMANCE OF TlE ADA

III.

EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY ........................................
640
A.
VIGNETTE STUDY DESIGN................................................
645
B . SCENARIO ON ........................................................
648
C. SCENARIO Two .......................................................
65

IV.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ...................................................
654

A.

COSTLY ACCOMMODA TIONS IMPOSEA GREA TER BARRIER
FOR JOB APPLICANTS...................................
..........................
655

B.

A CCOMMODA TION COSTS GIVE RISE To GREA TER CONCERN

TlAN DISTASTE OR DISABILITY ......................................
657
C.

Tim UNDERLYING

CONDITION CAN AFFECT WILLINGNESS

TO ACCOMMODATE ..........................................................
661

D.

ACCOMMODA TION IMPOSES A GRFA TER BARRIER FORJOB

APPLICANTS THAN EXISTING EMPLOYEES ................................
665

V.

VI.

IMPROVING THE

ADA ................................................
669

A.

AGAINST RESTRICTING CONVERSATIONS ATHIRING ..................
669

B.

BOUNDING ACCOMMODATION COSTS FOR EMPLOYERS ..............
673

C.

SUPPLEMENTING ACCOMMODATION COSTS FOR EMPLOYES ......
678

CONCLUSION ......................................................
681

APPEN DIX ..............................................................
684

2020]

ANTICIPA TING A CCOMMODA TION
I.

623

INTRODUCTION

Reasonable accommodation is the panacea for what ails disadvantaged
workers (or so legal scholars have suggested repeatedly over the past decade).,
For workers who have historically fared poorly in the labor market-but for
whom legal protections in the labor market have remained, at best, murky
-multiple scholars have argued that requiring employers to provide such
workers with reasonable accommodation is the ideal solution.2 This idea is
not novel; rather, it is based on the longstanding Americans with Disabilities
reasonable
Act
("ADA") 3 requirement that employers provide
accommodations for workers who are substantially limited in a major life
activity, regarded as substantially limited, or who have a record of substantial
limitation.4 The ADA reasonable accommodation model has been in place for
almost three decades in the private sector and even longer in the public
sector, so it has, in theory, endured for ample time to be vetted. Thus,
exporting this model as a solution for pregnant women, working parents,
caregivers, and other disadvantaged workers5 may seem obvious, tested,
manageable-reasonable.
Yet even a brief familiarity with the economics literature on the ADA
leaves reason to be concerned about exporting this legislative model. Labor

1. See, e.g., JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 177-208 (2019) (proposing reasonable accommodation for all
workers with health conditions, regardless of whether these conditions rise to the level of
disability); Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy DiscriminationLaw as It Approaches
Full Term, 52 IDA-Io L. REv. 825, 86o (2016) (arguing in favor of the Pregnant Workers Fairness
Act ("PWFA")); Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 54-58 (2o16) (arguing for reasonable
accommodation for working mothers and household caretakers); Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth
Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn't) Healthsm?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 895-901 (20 t6) (making the
initial argument for extending the reasonable accommodation mandate to workers with any
health condition); Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Eveiy Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689,
737-39 (2014) (arguing that any worker who could benefit from an employer-provided
reasonable accommodation should be entitled to one); Deborah A. Widiss, The Interaction of the
PregnancyDiscrimin.ationAct and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct AfterYoung v. UPS, 5 o U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1423, 1438 (2017) (arguing in favor of PWFA).
2.

See sources cited supranote 1.

3.
Note that here, and throughout this Article, I use the terms "ADA" and "reasonable
accommodation model" to refer more generally to the workplace protections afforded to
disabled individuals in the private sector under Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117
(2o2), and disabled individuals in the public sector under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-794 (2012). See also 29 U.S.C. § 7 9 4 (d) (2012) ("The standards used to determine
whether ... [the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a complaint alleging employment
discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 .... ).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1) (defining disability under the ADA as "a physical or mental
4.
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities[] . .. a record of such an
impairment[,] or ...being regarded as having such an impairment").
5.

See sources cited supra note 1.
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market outcomes for disabled individuals have not improved-and may have
actually declined-since the passage of the ADA. 6 In study after study,
economists have demonstrated that neither the employment rates nor wage
rates of disabled individuals have improved since Title I of the ADA went into
effect.7 To the extent that legal scholars have recognized this line of empirical

research and found fault with the ADA, 8 they have cast blame on definitional
ambiguities (and courts' restrictive interpretation of them) within the original
version of the Act.9 Nonetheless, most of these ambiguities were clarified and
expanded by Congress in the 2oo8 ADA Amendments Act ("ADAAA").

1°

In

the decade that has passed since the ADAAA, the available empirical evidence
indicates that labor market outcomes for disabled individuals still have not
improved.- In theory, more individuals with an activity limitation are covered

6.
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu &Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences ofEmplyo'ent Protection? The
Case of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 926-49 (2001) (finding that the

ADA decreased employment rates of disabled workers); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and
Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 701 (2000)

(finding a decline in employment and wages of disabled men following the passage of the ADA);
Julie L. Hotchkiss, A CloserLook at the Employment Impact of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 39J.
HUM. RESOURCES 887, 888, 909 (2004) (finding no effect of the ADA on the labor market

outcomes for disabled individuals in the labor market after accounting for changes in labor
supply); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilitieslollwing theADA, 42
INDUS. REL.:J. ECON. & SOc'Y 3 1, 61-62 (2003) (finding no "clear overall answer to the question

of whether the ADA has helped or hurt the employment of people with disabilities, since both
positives and negative signs can be found").
7.
See sources cited supra note 6.
8.
See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing UndertheAmericans withDisabilitiesAct, 62 OHIO
ST.L.J. 239, 247-77 (2001) (finding that ADA cases result in more victories for defendants than

any other type of federal antidiscrimination case); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants, 3 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 99, 1 oo (1999) (" [D]efendants

prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases
decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of those cases that are appealed, defendants prevail
in eighty-four percent of reported cases. These results are worse than results found in comparable
areas of the law; only prisoner rights cases fare as poorly." (footnotes omitted)).
9. See generally, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L.
REv. 397 (2000) (arguing for a subordination-focused approach to interpreting the ambiguous
definition of "disability" in the 1 990 version of the ADA); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (1999) (using the social model of disability to criticize the restrictive
definition of disability adopted by courts under the 1990 version of the ADA); Lisa Eichhorn,
Major Litigation Activities Regarding MajorLife Activities: The Failureof the "Disability"Definitionin the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405 (1999) (arguing that the ambiguous

definition of "disability" in the i990 Act, and courts' subsequent restrictive interpretations of it,
should be amended legislatively).
1o.

SeeADA Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 1 10-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2oo8).

11.
See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2031-32 (2o13) (finding evidence that courts

merely shifted the manner in which they blocked ADA cases from moving forward after the
passage of the ADAAA);Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty, 103 MINN. L. REV. 749,
802-03 (2o18) [hereinafter Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty] (finding that pregnant women with
complications, who theoretically have access to the Act's protections since the ADAAA, have not
seen their employment outcomes improve since the ADAAA); Jennifer Bennett Shinall, What
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under the Act than ever before, but such individuals have not seen an
improvement in their wage and employment rates.' 2 These latest post-ADAAA
findings raise a more troubling concern regarding whether the Act's
remaining problems are more than just poor drafting. They suggest that the
problem may be the ADA and the reasonable accommodation model itself.
Although in part based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the ADA
is unique among federal civil rights statutes. No other civil rights statute
explicitly requires that employers provide (and finance) workplace
accommodations.13 The reasonable accommodation feature of the ADA
enjoys a great deal of appeal from both a fairness and resource utilization
perspective. In theory, enabling individuals to be productive, contributing
members of the labor market through accommodation can decrease their
dependency on public entitlement programs and reduce any social stigma
attached to their condition. ,4
Nonetheless, given the failure of the ADA to meaningfully improve labor
market outcomes for its targeted population, economists have questioned the
practical realities of the reasonable accommodation model, developing many
theories over the years regarding why it is unsound.15 Yet lack of data has
prevented economists from fully testing these theories. Although economists
have sufficient data to demonstrate that disabled workers are less likely to be
employed and earn less than their similarly situated, nondisabled
counterparts, they lack sufficient data to explain why or how. More granularly,
they lack sufficient data to discern whether the reasonable accommodation
mandate is the problematic component of the ADA and, if so, when and why
reasonable accommodation becomes problematic.
In the absence of real-world observational data on how the reasonable
accommodation model works in practice, experimentally generated data can
fill this void. This Article is the first to examine how reasonable
accommodation works in practice by testing how experimental subjects-the
majority of whom have prior experience making human resources
decisions-respond to workers who require a workplace accommodation. The

Happens When the Definition of Disability Changes? The Case of Obesity, 5 IZAJ. LAB. ECON. 1, 1-3

(2016) [hereinafter Shinall, The Case of Obesity] (finding no evidence that obese individuals
impacted by Congress's expansion of the disability definition in the ADAAA have improved
employment outcomes).
12.
See sources cited supra note 11.
13.

But see generally Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000)

(discussing various state and federal laws that require employers to provide benefits to their
workers that could, in theory, be construed as accommodation).
14. For arguments that the ADA is both efficient and cost-effective, see generally J.H.
Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903 (2003); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity,
and "RealEfficiency": A Unified Approach, 44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1421 (2003).
15.

See infra Section II.A.
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experiment simulates how the interactive process, 6 of negotiating for an
accommodation works under the current ADA framework. The experiment
then compares whether subjects' willingness to accommodate workers
depends upon the nature of the proposed accommodation, the cost of the

accommodation, the nature of the worker's underlying health condition, and
the stage of employment at which accommodation is requested.17
The results indicate that workers who require an accommodation with a
non-zero cost face a serious disadvantage at the hiring stage. Nonetheless,
subjects exhibit a much greater willingness to provide costly accommodations
to already existing employees; even subjects who avoid hiring a worker in need
of accommodation demonstrate surprising generosity towards existing
employees in need of accommodation. s' These experimental results can be
explained, I argue, by the unintended consequences that arise from
restricting information flow and the behavioral economics theory of
ambiguity aversion.'9 The risks and rewards associated with anyjob candidate
are always somewhat ambiguous; these risks and rewards are even more
ambiguous for job candidates who require accommodation. In theory,

employers could reduce this ambiguity if they had more information about
the job candidate's underlying health condition and need for
accommodation: Employers could then better estimate how the condition was
likely to affect a worker's productivity, and how accommodating the worker
might affect the employer's bottom line. But, currently, the ADA prohibits
employers from gathering this information at the hiring stage. 20 Moreover,

16. The interactive process is a term coined by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") to describe the
information-gathering approach used by an employer with the employee to evaluate
a request for accommodation [under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act]. It is intended
to be a flexible approach that centers on the communication between an employer
and the individual requesting reasonable accommodation, but may (and often does)
involve obtaining relevant information from a supervisor and an individual's health
care provider.... The person who will decide whether to grant or deny a reasonable
accommodation ... engages in a discussion with the requestor and other relevant
individuals (e.g., a supervisor, a requestor's health care provider) to collect whatever
information is necessary to make an informed decision about whether the requestor
is covered as an individual with a disability and, if so, what reasonable
accommodation (s) will effectively eliminate the barrier identified by the requestor
and permit an equal opportunity to apply for ajob, to perform ajob or to gain access
to the workplace, or to enjoy access to the benefits and privileges of employment.
U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING REASONABLE
AccOMMODATION FOR INDIDUALS WITt DISABILITIES, available al https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/

internal/reasonable-accommodation.cfm [https://perma.cc/9V73-9TNH].
17.

See infra Part III.

See infra Part IV.
For a discussion of the theory of ambiguity aversion (and prior experimental validations
of the theory), see infra Section II.B.
20.
See infra Section II.A.
18.
19.
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even if the ADA were reformed to allow employers to gather such information
pre-offer, the underlying heterogeneity of disability (and health conditions
more generally) might not significantly clarify employers' estimates,
2
particularly forjob candidates. '

For these reasons, this Article instead recommends curbing employer
hesitance towards workers in need of accommodation in a different manner:
placing explicit limits on the amount an employer must spend to
accommodate an employee. With a clear upper bound on the costs they can
incur to accommodate a worker, employers can more accurately assess the risk
associated with hiring a worker in need of accommodation. In fact, this Article
uses the experimental results regarding decisionmakers' willingness to pay for
accommodation to suggest a starting point for developing numerical upper
bounds through which legislators can modify the reasonable accommodation
model.22 Of course, these numerical upper bounds on employer costs carry
the risk of shutting some workers out of the labor market-some health
conditions, after all, necessitate very expensive accommodations. To ensure
that such individuals are able to participate in the labor market, this Article
also recommends a governmental supplement scheme to cover the costs of
accommodations beyond what employers must pay out of pocket. Federal and
state disability programs already exist to support disabled individuals who are
not working.23 Broadening these programs to enable more disabled
individuals to work by supplementing the cost of expensive accommodations
would not only be optimal from a resource utilization perspective, but would
also be consistent with the original purposes of the ADA to reduce the
"dependency and nonproductivity" that result from disabled individuals' lack
of labor market opportunities.24

In making these recommendations, this Article proceeds as follows. Part
II briefly reviews both the law and economics literature on the
disappointments of the ADA, before introducing the behavioral theories of
choice under uncertainty-and the theory of ambiguity aversion more
specifically-as a possible explanation behind these disappointments. Part III
explains the experimental design used to generate data regarding how
reasonable accommodation works in practice, and Part IV describes the
experimental results. Based on these results, Part V considers reforms to the
ADA to address the weaknesses identified through the experiment. Part VI
concludes by detailing how the suggested reforms can improve labor market

21.

See infra Section H.A.

22.

See infraSection V.B.

23.

See infra Section V.C.

(8) (2012); seealso Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: ArePeople with
Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. SCI. 71, 71-72 (1997) ("The
unprecedented growth in the younger disability-transfer population is counter to the goal of
integrating working-age people with disabilities into mainstream employment.").
24.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)
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1

outcomes for both disabled individuals and other individuals in need of
workplace accommodations.
II.

THE STATE OF DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE

Before introducing the experiment to assess how reasonable
accommodation under the ADA works in practice, I first step back to consider
prior critiques of the Act from both the law and economics literatures in
Section II.A. Section II.B then introduces the concept of ambiguity aversion
as a potential (yet previously overlooked) reason why the ADA may have failed
to improve disabled individuals' wage and employment outcomes since its
passage.
A. AssIssING TIlE PERFORMANCE OFitE

ADA

For nearly three decades, the ADA has promised "equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for
disabled Americans.25 Yet labor market data indicate that even now, as a
group, disabled individuals remain unequal, excluded, dependent, and
devalued in the labor market. 26 The earliest empirical studies of the ADA's
performance suggested that wage and employment outcomes of disabled
individuals

actually declined as a result of the Act.27 Although some

subsequent empirical studies have questioned the methodological
approaches of the earliest studies, 28 even these subsequent studies have
concluded that the ADA has not helped disabled individuals in the labor
market.29

At best, the wage and employment outcomes of disabled individuals have
remained unchanged.3o Nor has the passage of the ADAAA altered these
conclusions. Post-Amendment empirical studies exhibit no signs of

25.

42 U.S.C. § 121O 1(a)(7).

See Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and
26.
Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sc. 53, 70 (1997) ("[P]eople with disabilities have
overestimated the ability of a civil rights act to significantly alter employment rates and
circumstances.").
27.
See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 6, at 926-49 (finding lower employment rates
(finding lower
of disabled workers after the ADA's passage); DeLeire, supra note 6, at 70
employment rates and wages for disabled workers after the ADA's passage); see also Kathleen
Beegle & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability DiscriminationLaws, 38 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 8o6, 856-57 (2003) (finding that wage and employment outcomes of disabled
individuals declined after the passage of state laws similar to the ADA).

28.
See, e.g., Hotchkiss, supra note 6, at 887-88 (arguing that previous studies had failed to
account for changes in the labor market supply of disabled individuals during the 199os); Kruse
& Schur, supra note 6, at 61-62 (arguing that previous studies had failed to account for how the
definition of disability in the data could impact empirical results).
29.
See Hotchkiss, supranote 6, at 909 (concluding that the ADA had no effect on disabled
individuals' labor market outcomes); Kruse & Schur, supra note 6, at 6 1-62 (finding no effect of
the ADA on labor market outcomes).

30.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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improvement in the labor market outcomes of disabled individuals,3' despite
the ADAAA's stated purpose of "reinstating a broad scope of protection to be
available under the ADA."32
Prior empirical studies have certainly indicated that something is wrong
with the reasonable accommodation model, but they cannot pinpoint the
problem. These studies have relied on market-level wage and employment
data-the only data available for study-and, as such, cannot identify when,
why, or how the ADA fails disabled individuals in the employment process.33
Indeed, prior empirical studies cannot prove that the reasonable
accommodation mandate is at fault for the ADA's disappointing labor market
effects. Although the mandate is the signature feature of the ADA (leading
many to suspect that the mandate is to blame),94 another flaw in the Act could
undermine its efficacy. Before the 2oo8 Amendments, for example, legal
scholars often faulted the vague definition of disability for the Act's failures.35
But the persistence of these failures in the decade since Congress clarified the
definition of disability in the ADAAA36 suggests that the ADA suffers from a
more fundamental flaw.
Even if the problem with the ADA is its reasonable accommodation
mandate, lack of data has prevented empiricists from identifying whether the
problem is the reasonability portion or the accommodation portion of the

31.

See generally Shinall, The PregnancyPenalty, supra note i i (finding that pregnant women

with complications, who theoretically have access to the Act's protections since the ADAAA, have
not seen their employment outcomes improve since the ADAAA); Shinall, The Case of Obesity,
supranote i (finding no evidence that obese individuals impacted by Congress's expansion of
the disability definition in the ADAAA have improved employment outcomes).
32. ADA Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2 (b) (1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
33. To identify when and why employers may avoid employing disabled individuals with
precision using observational data would require detailed information on the motivations behind
individual employers' human resources decisions. Many employers do not document the
motivations behind human resources decisions in great detail, but even the ones who do
understandably refuse to turn over such information to researchers for fear of legal and economic
ramifications. For these reasons, discrimination is typically the residual hypothesis in a labor
market study based on observational data. In other words, a researcher can only conclude that
discrimination is likely responsible for observed inequities in the labor market after eliminating
all other possible explanations.
34. For examples of scholars who have blamed the reasonable accommodation mandate for
the ADA's failure to improve labor market outcomes of disabled individuals, see Acemoglu
& Angrist, supra note 6, at 926-49; DeLeire, supra note 6, at 70 1; and StewartJ. Schwab & Steven
L. Willborn, ReasonableAccommodation of Workplace Disabilities,44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1197, 1281
-83 (2003).
35.
See, e.g., Jill C. Anderson,Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 17 YALE L.J. 992, 997-98 (2oo8) (arguing that a rigorous linguistics analysis exposes the

ambiguity of the definition of disability in the ADA, which the author identifies as the inherent
weakness of the Act's original version); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra note i i and accompanying text.
36.
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policy (or both).37 Economists have tended to blame the latter portion,
arguing that employer-mandated accommodation policies necessarily raise
the cost of employing workers in need of them. As a result, employers have
been incentivized to shirk their legal responsibilities under the mandate
whenever the additional cost of accommodating a worker in need exceeds the
difference in profitability between that worker in need and the next best
worker.38 Yet even though the accommodation portion has been the primary
target of most economists' critiques, the reasonability portion of reasonable
accommodation mandate is just as likely problematic.
Under the ADA, what it means for an accommodation to be reasonable
is far from clear. Congress has never explicitly defined the term; instead, the
Act merely provides examples of what accommodations "may" be reasonable,
including:
[M]aking existing facilities ... readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities[,] ... job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, [and] the provision of qualified readers or interpreters .... 39
Along these lines, the only limit that Congress has ever placed on the required
efforts employers must undertake with respect to accommodating disabled
Workers is the concept of "undue hardship."4o This term is one of the few that
has been defined since the Act's inception as "significant difficulty or expense
... in light of ... the nature and cost of the accommodation, ... the
[employer's] overall financial resources,... [and] the type of operation[s]."4'
Perhaps this definition is better than nothing at all-still, it provides
enormous discretion to courts and creates a great deal of uncertainty for
employers trying to determine their responsibilities under the Act. No clear
guideposts exist to help employers determine when a costly accommodation
constitutes a significant difficulty or expense.4V

37. Because the only data to which economists (and other empiricists) have gained access
is market-level observational data on wage and employment outcomes, see supra note 33,
economists have been unable to identify when or why the reasonable accommodation mandate

may backfire.
38.

See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 6, at 926-49 (arguing that requiring employers to

pay for any accommodation is problematic because it makes hiring disabled workers more costly);
see supra sources cited note 27 and accompanying text (demonstrating through simple models
why mandating that employers pay for accommodations may have unintended consequences).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (2012).
40.

See id.§ 12111(10).

41.

Id.

42.
See id. § 121 11 (9)- ( o) (failing to provide a test or guidelines, such as cost-benefit
analysis, by which courts should analyze reasonable accommodation and undue hardship); see
also generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 47
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Without clear guideposts, employers will necessarily struggle in
estimating how much they must spend in order to comply with the reasonable
accommodation mandate. The examples of reasonable accommodations
listed in the Act cannot satisfy the needs of every disabled worker (nor were
they meant to do so, as Congress intended the list to be nonexhaustive).43
Furthermore, even these listed examples of reasonable accommodations44
may not always be reasonable for every worker who requests them, but the Act
falls short of explaining at what point these examples will cease to be
reasonable. A "modified work schedule,"45 for example, may be a reasonable
accommodation in the short-term, but not forever. In a similar manner, the
ADA's additional limitation that an accommodation not create an undue
hardship for employers fails to add any precision regarding employers'
6
financial responsibility towards disabled workers.4
Two additional features of the ADA further encumber employers who
attempt to estimate the financial limits of the reasonable accommodation
mandate. First, the ADA arguably covers an unlimited number of physical and
mental health conditions.47 As such, successful accommodation of one worker
may provide little to no insight regarding the successful accommodation of
another worker, due to the high degree of heterogeneity in the covered
population. Indeed, the population covered by the ADA is so diverse that what
reasonable accommodation looks like in practice-from cost to duration to
8
disruptiveness in the workplace-looks different for every covered worker.4

GA. L. REV. 527 (2013) (arguing that a clearer test is needed to determine whether an
accommodation is reasonable); Mark C. Weber, UnreasonableAccommodation and Due Hardship,62
FLA. L. REv. 11 19 (2010) (arguing that the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
analyses cannot be separated).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 121 1 1 (9) (defining what reasonable accommodation "may include").
44.

See id.

45. See id. (giving part-time and modified work schedules as examples of possible reasonable
accommodations).
46. See id. § 1211 1 (1 o) (B) (failing to provide explicit limits on employers' expenditures on
employee accommodations).
47. See id. § 12 102 (1) (defining disability broadly as substantially limiting an individual in a
major life activity instead of listing specific conditions covered by the Act).
48.

Cf Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable

Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 13 (1996) ("Application of the ADA thus depends on the
interaction of four factors: the individual's particular disability; the essential functions of the job
she seeks to perform; the possible accommodations that would enable her to do the job; and the
burden that those accommodations would impose on the employer. The very complexity of the
calculus means that ADA cases are likely to be intensely context-specific."); Matthew A. Shapiro,
LaborGoals and AntidiscriminationNorms: Employer Discretion, ReasonableAccommodation, and the Costs
of Individualized 7reatment, 32 YALE L. & POL'YREv. 1, 28 (20 13) ("The ADA... usually mandates

a more individualized response. Rather than accommodate a disabled employee by revising a
generally applicable workplace policy, an employer will typically craft an exemption that applies
to the employee alone. Such an approach is explicitly contemplated by both the ADA itself and
the EEOC's enforcement guidelines .. " (footnotes omitted)).
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The health conditions underlying the need for accommodation can be
so varied that only the largest employers are likely to have prior experience
accommodating a worker with the same condition. Moreover, for common
disabling conditions, such as arthritis, an employer's prior experience with
another employee may not be informative since these conditions can vary
widely in terms of body part affected, frequency, duration, and response to
medical treatment.49 As a result, even the most sophisticated employers must
typically rely on a worker's representations about what accommodation is
needed-and for how long-during the interactive process used to determine
the appropriate accommodation.50 Even assuming that workers are always
truthful in their representations about the extent to which they require
accommodation during the process,s1 workers may not fully know (or even
have a best guess) about their prognosis.52
Second, and relatedly, the ADA impedes employers' ability to collect
what information workers do have regarding their prognosis, particularly at
the hiring stage. In an effort to protect job candidates with a disability, the
ADA severely constrains discussions about reasonable accommodation during
the interview process.53 Employers cannot "conduct a medical examination or
make inquiries of ajob applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual
with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability"54 before
making an offer of employment. Instead, they are limited to inquiring about

49.
Well-known diseases can affect even the most successful individuals in vastly different
manners. See, e.g., Madeline R. Vann, 14 Famous People with Parkinson'sDisease,EVERYDAY HEALri I
(July 31, 2018), https://www.everydayhealth.com/parkinsons-disease-pictures/famous-peoplewith-parkinsons-disease.aspx [https://perma.cc/JX66-QV8L] (comparing celebrities such as
Michael J. Fox, Janet Reno, Alan Alda, Neil Diamond, and Muhammed Ali, who all have
Parkinson's Disease but have all had varying levels of symptom progression).
50.

See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNIIY COMM'N, TIlE AMERICANS WIH DISABILITIES ACT:

APPLYING PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WIii DISABILITIES (2017),

[htups://perma.cc/8VGZavailable at https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conducLhtml
("When an employee requests a reasonable accommodation in response to the
employer's discussion or evaluation of the person's performance, the employer may proceed with
the discussion or evaluation but also should begin the 'interactive reasonable accommodation
process' by discussing with the employee how the disability may be affecting performance and
4 YMH]

what accommodation the employee believes may help to improve it."); see also supra note 16.
Individuals who seek formal career advice, however, are likely to be advised to conceal
51.
any need for accommodation at the hiring stage, even if the need is apparent. For a discussion of
career advisors' common advice to conceal the need for flexibility and accommodation in the
workplace (particularly related to family-related needs), see generally Hersch & Shinall, supra
note 1 (demonstrating that women with a resume gap were better off revealing the reason for
the gap in the hiring setting).
52.
Diseases vary widely in symptoms, progression, and prognosis. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 49.
53.

See U.S. EQuAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,JOB APPLICANTS AND THE AMERICANS WITII

DISABILITIES ACT (2017), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/jobapplicant.html [https://
perma.cc/6VS 5 -HKF7] ("The ADA prohibits employers from asking questions that are likely to
.
reveal the existence of a disability before making ajob offer .
54.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012).
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"the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions."55 At baseline,
employers have remarkably little information aboutjob candidates (whether
disabled or not), particularly compared to existing employees. Accurately
projecting a candidate's workplace productivity using a resume, references,
and an interview is difficult enough; with only these tools in hand, employers
must additionally attempt to project the feasibility of accommodating a
disabled candidate under the ADA. With this provision, the Act attempts to
take the issue of disability off the table during the hiring process.56 But in
reality, it may only increase an employer's uncertainty towards job candidates
with a visible disability orjob candidates who volunteer their disability Status.57
In such cases, the employer will be on notice that a candidate may need
accommodation if hired, yet cannot ask the candidate all the necessary
questions to assess the feasibility of accommodating the candidate until after
an offer of employment is made.
For these reasons, employers trying to abide by their legal obligations
under the ADA may find themselves unable to estimate the risk (if any)
associated with employing a disabled worker.58 As currently structured, both
the requirements and the limits of the reasonable accommodation mandate
remain uncertain for employers-including employers with full information
on the worker's underlying condition. Even assuming the best case scenario,
in which the employer has full information and understands the exact
accommodation that a worker needs to function in the workplace, imprecise
definitions of what it means for an accommodation to be reasonable or to
create an undue hardship may leave the employer unable to determine
whether he has a legal obligation to provide such accommodation to the
worker. More realistic, however, is a scenario in which an employer has
incomplete information about a worker's underlying health condition due to
the heterogeneity of conditions covered by the ADA. In this instance, the Act
impedes, rather than facilitates, the flow of information to the employer
necessary to estimate the cost of accommodation. This two-fold uncertainty
propagated among employers by the ADA should give rise to concern, given

55. Id. § 121 12(d) (2) (B).
56. See Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., i 6o F. 3 d 591, 594 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The legislative history
of the ADA indicates that Congress wished to curtail all questioning that would serve to identify
"); see also Bates v.
and exclude persons with disabilities from consideration for employment ..
Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 767 F. 3 d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2014); Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville,
5 9 3 F. 3 d 12o6, 1213-14 (1 1th Cir. 2010).
57.
Indeed, the EEOC explicitly states in its guidance that "an employer cannot ask questions
about an applicant's disability either because it is visible or because the applicant has voluntarily
disclosed a hidden disability." U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNFIY COMM'N, supra note 53.

58. Along these lines, sociologist Nancy R. Mudrick has previously attributed the
disappointing labor market outcomes of the ADA to the fact that "[e]mployers have
See Mudrick, supra note
overestimated the costs and difficulties of complying with the law .
26, at 70.
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the well-documented behavioral response most individuals exhibit under
such conditions: avoidance.
B.

TlE AMBIGUITY OFD1SABILITY

As highlighted in Section I.A, employers trying to abide by their legal
obligations under the ADA face a great deal of uncertainty when determining
how best to respond to the Act's reasonable accommodation mandate. After
explaining why such uncertainty is best classified as ambiguity, this Section
examines why such ambiguity can be problematic in the employment
decisionmaking context, in light of the well-established behavioral economics
theory of ambiguity aversion (also known as ambiguity avoidance).59
1.

Ambiguity Aversion in Theory

The behavioral economics theory of ambiguity aversion posits that, for
any given level of risk, individuals will prefer known risks over unknown risks.
According to the theory, when the expected value of the two risks are
identical, individuals will prefer the less ambiguous risk over the more
ambiguous risk.6° Ambiguity aversion is both irrational and inconsistent with
neoclassical economics theory. To see why, an example used by the theory's
pioneer, Daniel Ellsberg, is useful. 6' Ellsberg famously proposed the "twocolor problem," in which an individual is asked to bet whether a ball drawn at
random from an urn will be red or black in color. When the individual is given
the choice of more than one urn on which to bet, Ellsberg proposed that
individual would select the urn with the least ambiguous distribution of red
and black balls. If one urn has a known 5o/5o distribution, whereas the other
urn has an unknown distribution, Ellsberg's theory predicts that individuals
will choose to bet on the urn with the 50/5o distribution-despite the
62
possibility that the other urn may entirely be filled with balls of one color.
Ellsberg's theory of ambiguity aversion, which falls within the ambit of
behavioral economics theories regarding individual choice under

59.
Compare HillelJ. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Decision Making Under Ambiguity: A Note.,
in RISK, DECISION AND RATIONALIFIY 327, 327-28 (Bertrand R. Munier ed., 1988) (describing the

behavioral phenomenon as ambiguity avoidance), with Selwyn W. Becker & Fred 0. Brownson,
What Price Ambiguity? Or the Role of Ambiguity in Decision-Making,72 J. POL. ECON. 62, 70 (1964)
(describing the same phenomenon as ambiguity aversion).
6o.

See, e.g., Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and ComparativeIgnorance, 11 o

Q.J. ECON. 585, 585-86 (1995) (summarizing ambiguity aversion as the phenomenon in which
"people prefer to bet on known rather than on unknown probabilities").
61. The theory of ambiguity aversion is also known as the Ellsberg Paradox. See generally
Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (196 s) (proposing the
theory of ambiguity aversion).
62.

See also David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, 44J.

LEGAL STUD. S319, S3 22 (2015) (discussing the theory of ambiguity aversion and noting that
"individuals choosing a set of payoffs will demand a higher premium for ambiguous choices than

for merely risky ones").
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uncertainty, is sometimes confused with the theory of risk aversion. Like
ambiguity aversion, risk aversion also theorizes how individuals behave under
uncertainty, but the two theories are distinguishable. Risk aversion theorizes
that, given the choice between two bets with the same expected value, an
individual will choose the less risky bet.6 3 Thus, risk aversion relies on an
individual at least being able to proxy the underlying probabilities involved.
Ambiguity aversion, on the other hand, arises when the individual cannot
estimate the underlying probabilities well. 6 4 Returning to the two-color
problem, the individual has no way of guessing what the distribution of balls
in the ambiguous urn will be before betting on the color of the ball drawn. At
worst, the color distribution will be 50/50 (the same as the urn with the
known distribution). At best, the urn will contain balls of all one color. The
individual cannot estimate the probability of selecting either a red or black
ball from the ambiguous urn.
Along these lines, the situation faced by employers with a disabled
employee orjob candidate is more analogous to ambiguity aversion than risk
aversion. 6 5 There exists some level of risk with employing any worker, whether
disabled or not, and the ADA does not require employers to hire a disabled
worker unless she is the most qualified candidate for the job. Therefore, the
expected productivity of a disabled worker (with or without accommodation)
should always be at least as great as the productivity of the next best worker
for the job. Nonetheless, employers have little idea how risky (if at all) hiring
and accommodating a highly qualified disabled worker will be. Because of the
underlying heterogeneity of the population protected by the ADA, employers
will necessarily have difficulty arriving at a reliable estimate of ADA
compliance costs for any given disabled worker. As discussed in Section II.A,
an employer's experience accommodating a prior disabled worker may not
well inform the employer's experience accommodating a future disabled
worker since the two workers may suffer from vastly different underlying
health conditions. Even if the two workers suffer from the same health
condition, the employer's experience with the former may not well inform
the employer's experience with the latter because the same health condition
can manifest differently in two individuals.
For instance, consider an employer who is contemplating hiring a job
candidate with type 2 diabetes. Accommodating a previous employee with this

63. For example, a risk-averse individual may prefer to receive $1 0o with certainty than to
have a io percent chance of receiving $1,ooo and a go percent chance of receiving $o.
64. See Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 59, at 327 ("Ellsberg's paradox shows that people's
decisions are affected not only by the probabilities of events, but also by the degree of
uncertainty-or ambiguity-surrounding their estimates of these probabilities."); Fox & Tversky,
supra note 6o, at 585 ("One of the fundamental problems of modern decision theory is the
analysis of decisions under ignorance or ambiguity, where the probabilities of potential outcomes
are neither specified in advance nor readily assessed on the basis of the available evidence.").
See also infta note 151 and accompanying text.
65.
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common condition 66 may have been extremely costly for the employer, as
diabetes can have devastating complications when not well managed,
including loss of limbs, blindness, and organ failure. 67 But the employer's bad
experience with one prior employee may be totally uninformative for future
employees with diabetes. Over half of patients diagnosed with diabetes
nonetheless report being able to work without any limitations 8 and rate their
health status as good to excellent.69 The employer, as a result, will have
difficulty predicting the onerousness of accommodating any one particular
worker who has the health condition-even if the employer has prior
experience with other workers who have the condition.
The difficulty employers face in accurately assessing the risk (or lack
thereof) associated with employing a disabled worker is particularly acute for
job candidates.7o The lesser degree of familiarity that employers have with
respect to job candidates, as opposed to existing employees, makes it even
more difficult to predict .with accuracy how costly and how feasible
accommodating a worker will be. Similarly, workers with uncommon health
conditions make it difficult for employers to evaluate whether a reasonable
accommodation exists, and whether the cost will be prohibitive. Layered on
top of this ambiguity regarding how much accommodation a worker will need
is the additional ambiguity regarding how much accommodation for which
an employer is legally responsible. As discussed in Section II.A, at what cost
an accommodation becomes unreasonable or an undue hardship remains
unclear under the ADA.
In short, under the current ADA framework, employers continue to face
a number of ambiguities with respect to disabled workers-ambiguities
regarding the feasibility of accommodation, the costliness of accommodation,

66.

According to a 2017 report by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,

approximately 30.3 million Americans (9.4 percent of the population) have diabetes. Press
o Million Americans Have Diabetes or Prediabetes
Release, CDC, New CDC Report: More than to
(July 18, 2017), available at https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2o17/po718-diabetesreport.html [https://perma.cc/JD7 5 -NPGS].
67.
See id. ("People with diabetes are at increased risk of serious health complications
including premature death, vision loss, heart disease, stroke, kidney failure, and amputation of
toes, feet, or legs.").
68.
2o.o percent of individuals with diabetes ages 2o-44, and 27.7 percent of individuals
with diabetes ages 45-64, report a limitation in their ability to work resulting from their diabetes.
Edward W. Gregg & Andy Menke, Diabetes and Disability, in NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALT Ii, DIABETES IN
AMERICA 34-6 ( 3 d ed. 2018).

69.

Conversely, 48 percent of individuals with diabetes report being in fair or poor health.

Andy Menke et. al., Physical and Metabolic Characteristicsof Persons with Diabetes and Prediabetes, in
NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DIABETES IN AMERICA 9-24 ( 3 d ed. 2018).
70.
For this reason, it is difficult for employers to statistically discriminate against disabled
employees since, given the underlying heterogeneity of the disabled population, there is no
average disabled employee (or, at the very least, the "average" disabled employee is not a helpful
metric for future disabled employees). For a discussion of the concept of statistical
discrimination, see infra note 128 and accompanying text.
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the likelihood that the accommodation will be successful, and the employers'
legal responsibility to accommodate in the first place. The behavioral
economics theory of ambiguity aversion suggests that these multiple
ambiguities may be cause for concern with respect to disabled workers in the
labor market-despite the alleged protections available to these workers
under the ADA-since the Act allows these ambiguities to persist from the
employers' perspective. As such, the theory would predict that employers will
continue to avoid the resulting situation, in which employers are unable to
proxy the risks (if any) associated with employing a disabled worker, under
the current version of the ADA. Although theory does not always bear out in
practice, the theory of ambiguity aversion has been repeatedly documented
in experimental settings, as reviewed in the next Section. This prior
experimental evidence serves to heighten concerns regarding how ambiguity
aversion may be interfering with the labor market success of disabled workers
under the reasonable accommodation model.
2.

Ambiguity Aversion in Practice

In the half-century since Ellsberg's proposal of ambiguity aversion, the
theory has been well validated in the experimental economics literature.
Experimentalists have verified not only Ellsberg's two-color problem
prediction in the laboratory setting7' but also the theory's applicability to
other real-world policies.72 Experiments have documented individuals'
preferences to avoid ambiguity in contractual agreements,73 financial
decisions,74 and legal compliance75--all of which have implications for how

71.
See, e.g., Becker & Brownson, supra note 59, at 73 (finding "that some subjects, in
violation of the Savage axioms, express an aversion to ambiguity, and under payoff conditions
will pay to avoid it"); Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, Who Accepts Savage's Axiom, i 9 BEHAV. SCI. 368,
368 (1974) (showing "subjects' initial choices often violate[ Savage's sure-thing principle]").
For a review of the behavioral economics literature on ambiguity aversion, see Colin
72.
Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 332-41 (1 992) (examining in brief the extensive ambiguity aversion
literature in behavioral economics).
73.
See, e.g., Christian Kellner & Gerhard Riener, The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Reward
Scheme Choice, 125 ECON. LETTERS 134, 135-37 (2014) (demonstrating experimentally the effect
of ambiguity on preferences for contractual compensation schemes).
See, e.g., Aurllien Baillon & Han Bleichrodt, TestingAmhiguity Models Through the Measurement
74.
of Probabilitiesfor Gains and Losses, 7 AM. ECON.J.: MICROECONOMIcs 77, 85 (2015) (asking subjects to
take bets on the movement of a familiar stock index and an unfamiliar stock index).
75.
For example, prior research has demonstrated that increased ambiguity regarding tax
auditing policy increases taxpayer compliance. SeeArthur Snow & Ronald S. Warren,Jr., Ambiguity
About Audit Probability, Tax Compliance, and Taxpayer Welfare, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 865, 870 (2005)
(demonstrating through experimental evidence that increasing uncertainty regarding tax audit
probability increases tax code compliance in "ambiguity-averse" individuals but has the opposite
effect in "ambiguity loving" individuals). The implications of ambiguity aversion with respect to
criminal conduct have also been well explored. For a thorough review of this literature, see
Hannah Frank, Note, UnambiguousDeterrence: Ambiguity Attitudes in thejuvenilejustice System and the
Casefor a Right to CounselDuringntakeProceedings,
7 0 VAND. L. REV. 709, 714-20 (2017).
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relevant laws should be structured. Yet less well understood is the role of
ambiguity aversion in the workplace. In fact, the only existing study to
consider ambiguity aversion in the labor market is a 2016 study examining
how this behavioral phenomenon impacted women returning to work after a
6
career break.7
There, like here, the authors of the 2016 study had reason to suspect that
the legal regime meant to protect women may be backfiring on account of
information flow restrictions. Because women continue to bear the majority
of household caretaking responsibilities,7 caretaking-related career breaks
for women remain incredibly common among women in the United States
one-third of mothers stay at home with their children for some
-almost
period of time.78 Yet Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
guidance discourages employers from discussing household caretaking
responsibilities, particularly with female workers, out of concern that
employers will use such discussions to discriminate against them in violation
of Title VJI.79 Nevertheless, in an environment where honest conversations
about caretaking responsibilities are stifled, women continue to be at a

76.

See Hersch & Shinall, supra note i.

See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the American Time Use Survey,
77.
7 REv. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159, 166 (2009) (documenting that the average married woman spends
28.76 minutes on childcare every day, but the average married man spends only 15.67 minutes); see
also Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty, supranote i i, at 764 ("And yet, as much as the traditional norm
of mothers staying at home with their children has eroded over the past half century, it remains
prevalent. ... An employer's assumption that the primary caretaking burden of a new child will fall
on the woman will, more often than not, have some validity." (footnotes omitted)).
See D'vera Cohn et al., After Decades of Decline, A Rise in Stay-at-Ifome Mothers, PEW RES.
78.
CTR. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2o 14/o4/o8/after-decades-of-decline-arise-in-stay-at-home-mothers [https://perma.cc/32VZ-PY7 A].
See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES AND MARITAL
79.
STATUS OR NUMBER OF CttILDREN, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries
marital status.cfm [https://perma.cc/8YSA-E6 9 E] ("Questions about marital status and number
and ages of children are frequently used to discriminate against women and may violate Title VII
if used to deny or limit employment opportunities. It is clearly discriminatory to ask such
questions only of women and not men (or vice-versa). Even if asked of both men and women,
such questions may be seen as evidence of intent to discriminate against, for example, women
with children.").
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disadvantage in the workplace,so particularly if they have taken a prior career
break.8 ,
Suspecting that the stifling of caretaking-related conversations may have
unintended consequences, the authors of the 2o16 study demonstrated
experimentally that employers were overwhelmingly more likely to hire a
female job candidate who volunteered why she had taken a career break over
a female job candidate who did not openly discuss her break. The authors
attributed this result to ambiguity aversion-employers could not reliably
proxy the risk associated with hiring a female candidate returning from a
career break when they did not know why she had taken the career break.
Consequently, the authors advocated for modifications to the EEOC's Title
VII guidance that encouraged honest conversations at the interview stage
82
between employers andjob candidates.
With the exception of the 2o16 study, law and economics scholarship has
largely ignored how current legal regimes may sustain, and may even
promote, ambiguity in the workplace. The prior study identified these
weaknesses within the Title VII enforcement regime, but Title VII may not be
the only employment law that has such unintended consequences. As this Part
has suggested, the ADA may also foster ambiguity-leading to employer
ambiguity aversion. Economist Marjorie Baldwin, who has empirically
documented the persistence of disabled workers' poor labor market
outcomes since the passage of the ADA, has raised similar concerns with
respect to the uncertainty promoted by the reasonable accommodation

8o. Although the gender gap is well documented, this gap is particularly wide between
women who are mothers and men who are fathers. For empirical research documenting a robust
"motherhood penalty" and "fatherhood premium," see, for example, DeborahJ. Anderson et al.,
The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule
Hexibility, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 273, 291 (2003) (finding a three to five percent wage
penalty for mothers). See also ShelleyJ. Correll et al., Getting ajob: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?,
1 12 AM.J. SOC. 1297, 1332 (2007) (documenting employer discrimination against mothers, but
not fathers); Rebecca Glauber, Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage
Premium, 22 GENDER & SOC'Y 8, 16-19 (2OO8) (exploring differences in wage premiums for

fathers of diverse races and ethnicities).
81.
Anecdotal evidence abounds on the difficulty of returning to the labor market after a
child-related career break. See, e.g., Kelly Wallace, Morns 'Opting In' to Work Find Doors Shut, CNN
(Aug. 13, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/13/living/parents-mothers-opt-to-

work/index.html [https://perma.cc/T3S2-TJE2] (reporting on a survey conducted by a small,
local nonprofit that found "38.3% [of stay-at-home mothers] said they wanted to return [to work]
but were having difficulty getting back in and an 'overwhelming' 53.7% cited resistance to hiring
because of their stay-at-home status"); Tara Weiss, How Stay-at-Home Mona Can Get Back to Work,
FORBES (May 19, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2oo9/o 5 /19/relaunch-career-

woman-leadership-careers-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/Q 5 N9 -F5 EF] ("Returning to work is a
challenge even in a strong job market .... ").
82.
See Hersch & Shinall, supra note i, at 87 ("Whether the subject of the information is
family status, criminal history, or disability accommodation, underserved groups are best served
when they can have open and honest conversations with their employers." (footnote omitted)).
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model.8 3 Pointing to these concerns as an area for further research, Baldwin
has previously remarked that ADA compliance remains rather opaque for
employers, given the unclear legal bounds on their obligations combined with
the heterogeneous accommodation needs of the disabled population.4 The
following Part explores whether the concerns raised by Baldwin, as well as the
concerns raised throughout this Part, are warranted, using an experimental
vignette study.
III.

EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY

In the absence of instructive observational human resources data, 85 an
alternative approach to assessing how the reasonable accommodation model
works in practice is to generate experimental data. In particular, experimental
vignette studies can provide insight into how decisionmakers react to
plausible employment scenarios in which issues arise surrounding the need
for a workplace accommodation. In these studies, subjects are randomly
assigned to view a scenario and asked to make a decision regarding that
scenario; while the scenarios are otherwise similar, some scenarios prime
subjects with respect to the issue of interest-here, the need for a workplace
accommodation due to a health condition. Researchers then test whether
inter- and intra-subject responses meaningfully differ when scenarios involve
86
the issue of interest.
Experimental vignette studies have become increasingly common in the
legal literature over the past two decades.8 7 Scholars have principally used

83.
SeeMarjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Ilts
Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALSAM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 37, 48-50 (1997).

84.

See id. at 47.

Another reason that information problems may be an important source of
discrimination against workers with disabilities is that the group is extremely
heterogeneous in the characteristics that affect productivity. Employers are unlikely
to be well informed regarding the functional limitations associated with every
possible type of impairment. The problem is further complicated because
experience and skills vary across workers with the same impairment .... This creates
another source of uncertainty for employers as they attempt to predict the
productivity of persons with disabilities.
Id.

85. See supranote 33 and accompanying text (discussing why observational data do not exist
to test how reasonable accommodation works in practice).
86. For additional details on experimental vignette studies and the type of inferences that
can be drawn from random assignment of subjects to view different scenarios, see Christiane
Atzmuiller & Peter M. Steiner, ExperimentalVignette Studies in Survey Research,6 METrHODOLOGY 128,
129-30 (2010).

87. Very recent examples of experimental vignette studies in the legal literature include
Hersch & Shinall, supra note i (demonstrating that women with a resume gap were better off
revealing the reason for the gap in the hiring setting); Justin Sevier, PopularizingHearsay, 104
GEo. LJ. 643, 665-67 (2016) (using such a study to assess juror reactions to hearsay); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1'7,
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these studies to assess judge and juror decisionmaking, 8 consumer
sensibilities towards principles of contract law,8 9 and bias towards historically
disadvantaged groups.9o Experimental vignette studies have been used
previously in the employment context, albeit in a more limited fashion, to
assess how decisionmakers evaluate workers in scenarios that implicate
existing employment discrimination laws. A 2013 study by Ian Ayres and
Richard Luedeman, for example, demonstrated that knowledge of an
individual's sexual preferences led subjects to stereotype that person in other
contexts. In the employment context, such stereotyping could implicate Tide
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex stereotyping in the
workplace.9' Similarly, the 2o16 study discussed in Section II.B.2 used an
experimental vignette study to question the wisdom of EEOC guidance, which
advises employers to avoid asking employees about household caretaking

149-53 (2017) (using such a study to demonstrate consumer belief that boilerplate contract
terms were legally enforceable and defensible if disclosed up front).
88.
See, e.g., Susan D. Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator's Mind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, i166
(2017) (exploring the rationality of decisions made by arbitrators in the international arbitration
context); Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language ofMens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REv. 1327, 1349-58
(2014) (analyzingjuror perceptions of mens rea culpability categories); Joni Hersch & Beverly
2
Moran, Coitus and Consequences in the Legal System: An Experimental Study, 68 SMU L. REV. 9 7, 935
-44 (2015) (investigating whether and how knowledge of a previous sexual relationship between
legal adversaries influences subjects' perceptions of appropriate outcomes in civil actions);Justin
Sevier, Testing Tribe's Triangle:Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 1o3 GEO. LJ. 879, 903
-22 (2015) (analyzingjuror discernment of hearsay evidence in criminal cases); Francis X. Shen
et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13o6, 1326-44 (201 1) (examining subjects' ability
to apply the legal definitions of mens rea in specific factual contexts).
See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Comnwn Sense of Contract
89.
Formation,67 STAN. L. REv. 1269, 1281-95 (2015) (examining subjects' intuitions about contract
formation); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Psychology of ContractPrecautions,8o U.
Ciii. L. REv. 395, 408-18 (2013) (examining parties' diverging approaches to self-protection
before and after they perceive that they have reached final agreement); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
David A. Hoffman, Breach Isfor Suckers, 6 3 VAND. L. REv. 1003, 1022-32 (201o) (examining
perceptions of contract breach).
o
Hadar Aviram & Annick Persinger, Perceiving and Reporting Domestic Violence
9 . See, e.g.,
Incidents in Unconventional Settings: A Vignette Survey Study, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 159, 185
(2012) (finding "that the tendency to report domestic violence to the police declines as the
incident diverges from the stereotypical male abuser/female victim scenario"); Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, Settling in the Shadow of Sex: Gender Bias in MaritalAsset Division, 40 CARDOZO L. REv. 1857,
1892-1901 (2019) (finding gender bias against divorcing female spouses in marital asset division
scenarios). See generally Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight
Views of PenetrativePreferencesCould Meanfor Sexuality Claims UnderPrice Waterhouse, 123 YALE LJ.
714 (2013) (finding evidence that knowledge of gay men's sexual preferences influenced how
subjects stereotyped them in other contexts).
o
91.
See generally Ayres & Luedeman, supra note 9 , at 750 ("[G]reater visibility of and
openness about gay men's sexual practices might actually lead some heterosexual observers to
hold less favorable attitudes towards the community.").
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responsibilities in order to comport with Title VII's prohibitions on sex
discrimination in the workplace.92

Like the 2016 study, the present vignette study asked subjects to hire one
of two finalist candidates, but here, one or more of the candidates could
require a workplace accommodation. Subjects additionally answered followup questions about their willingness to accommodate existing workers and
about the motivations behind their decisions. Also similar to prior
employment studies, experimental subjects in this study were voluntary
workers recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk ("mTurk") service.93 All
subjects were at least 18 years old, resided in the United States, and were paid
$1.50 for approximately 15 minutes of their time.94
Although at least two prior studies have recruited similar subject pools to
gain insight into the mechanisms of employer decisionmaking in scenarios
that implicate employment discrimination laws, this methodology has not
escaped critique. Perhaps the most compelling concern relates to the external
validity of the results derived from subjects who may or may not have hiring,
supervisory, or other relevant human resources experience.95 To answer this
critique, prior studies have primarily relied on data validating the responses
of the mTurk subject pool against responses of the U.S. population more
generally.96 These data provide reassurance that mTurk subjects' responses

92.
See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITYCOMM'N, supranote 79 (advising employers to avoid
asking questions about household caretaking responsibilities of either men or women).
93.
The mTurk service is widely used by academics for experimental vignette studies testing
legal decisionmaking. For an in-depth discussion of the representativeness and suitability of
mTurk samples in legal decision-making studies, see David A. Hoffman, From Promiseto Form:How
Contracting Online Changes Consumers,91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595, 1612 n.96 (20 16).
94.
The mTurk workers who signed up for the study were directed to the survey instrument,
which was programmed using the survey software Qualtrics. The survey provided two scenarios
involving employment decisionmaking and two scenarios involvingjuror decision-making. Here,
I confine the discussion to the two employment scenarios of relevance to the present Article.
95.
Here, the term external validity signifies whether a study's results can be extrapolated
from the experimental setting into the real-world setting. For experiments in the laboratory
setting, if subjects are not sufficiently similar to real-world decisionmakers, the results may be
subject to external validity concerns. For a discussion of external and internal validity threats in
observational data, field experiments, and laboratory experiments, see Justin Sevier, Vicarious
Windfalls, 1o9 IowAL. REV. 651, 705 (2017) (concluding that laboratory experiments "are riskier
with respect to external validity, although several studies suggest that this concern may be
overstated" (citing Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 287, 301-03 (1996))).
96.
See, e.g., Ilyana Kuziemko et al., Hlow Elastic Are PreferencesforRedistribution?Evidencefrom
Randomized Survey Experiments, 1o 5 AM. ECON. REV. 1478, 1480-81 (2015) (validating the
responses of mTurk workers against the responses of more established survey panels); Gabriele
Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING
411, 412 (2010) ("Internet subject populations tend to be closer to the U.S. population as a
whole than subjects recruited from traditional university subject pools."); see alsoAdamJ. Berinsky
et al., Separating the Shirkers from the Workers? Making Sure Respondents Pay Attention om SelfAdministered Surveys, 58 AM.J. POL. SCI. 739, 745 & n. 14 (2014)
(finding that mTurk subjects paid
more attention to screening questions than subjects recruited from other online pools).
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are not aberrant or anomalous; still, they cannot directly answer the question
of whether mTurk subjects' responses reflect the responses of individuals with
prior human resources experience. This study is the first to address the
concern directly and provide reassurance that the responses in this study (and
the prior two employment studies) are indicative of how people making
human resources decisions in the real world would respond.
Table 1 presents selected demographics of the 8,070 unique mTurk
subjects who participated in this study; the table also includes the
demographics from the 2015 Census Bureau estimates for comparison to the
U.S. population. In many ways, the mTurk subjects closely mirror the U.S.
population, particularly in terms of household income. Similar to other
mTurk experiments, the subjects who participated in this experiment are
younger, more educated, and much more likely to be employed than the
average person in the United States.97 The race/ethnicity distribution of the
subject pool largely mirrors that of the U.S. population, with subjects
identifying as Asian slightly overrepresented, subjects identifying as black or
African-American slightly underrepresented, and subjects identifying as
Hispanic/Latino more underrepresented (although still comprising more
than 8 percent of the sample).98

97.
See alsoJill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes?
An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 632 n.141 (2014) ("notling] that

the self-reported education level of [m]Turk subjects is higher than that of the general
population"); cf Gargi Bhattacharya & Margaret S. Stockdale, Perceptions of Sexual Harassmentby
Evidence Quality, Perceiver Gender, Feninism, and Right Wing Authoritarianism: Debunking Popular
Myths, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 594, 596 (2o 16) ("Research shows that data obtained from [m]Turk

samples are as reliable as traditional samples and that the samples are reflective of Internet-users:
slightly younger, more liberal, less religious, and more educated than the population as a whole."
(citations omitted)); Hersch & Shinall, supra note i, at 75 & n.12o (finding highly similar
demographics for a sample of 3022 mTurk subjects). See generally Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse
Chandler, Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool, 23 CURRENT
DIREcrIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCi. 184 (2014) (concluding that the ways in which mTurk subjects

depart from the U.S. population resemble typical U.S. internet users).
98. See supra note 97 (reporting similar race and ethnicity makeups in other mTurk samples).
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Table 1. Mechanical Turk Subject Demographics
C.aracteristic
Female

.mTurk

Sample
55.3%

U.S. population (4015)
5o.8%

Median Age

33.0

42.4

Married
Hispanic/Latino
White
Black/African-American

41.1%
8. t %
81.5%
1o.o%

48.8%
17.4%
77.4%
13.2%

Asian
B.A. or Higher (If 25+)

7.2%
57.7%

5.4%
28.8%

Employed

82.3%

59.5 %

Median Household Income ($2o 15)

$51,049

$53,545

6o5%
Previously Participated in a Hiring
Process
Notes: Mechanical Turk sample includes 8,070 unique subjects. Mean values are calculated
from the 2015 U.S. Census Bureau data. Age is calculated for employed persons only; U.S.
population numbers calculated for individuals who report only a single race.

Prior mTurk studies of employment decisions have argued that because
the vast majority of mTurk workers have another job besides taking surveys
(typically more than three-quarters of any given sample are otherwise
employed) and are highly educated, many are likely to have prior real-world
experience with human resources decisionmaking, making their responses to
employment vignette studies more credible.99 This study is the first to test the
validity of this argument and finds substantial evidence that its intuition is
correct. As reported in Table 1, more than 6o percent of subjects in this study
reported having previously participated in a hiring process (including
screening applications, interviewing applicants, and providing feedback on
applicants). - Consequently, for most subjects in this study, participating in
human resources decisions is a familiar process. Moreover, robustness checks
of the results presented in Sections III.A-.C demonstrated that responses did
not meaningfully differ between subjects based on their previous
participation in a hiring decision.°'
The 8,o7o mTurk subjects who participated in this experiment viewed
two different hiring scenarios that asked them to choose one of two finalist
candidates. Each of the two scenarios had 25 different variations, and subjects
were randomly assigned to view one variation of each. In all variations of the
scenarios, the two finalist candidates always had similar qualifications, but two
sources of variation could distinguish them. First, a finalist candidate might

99. See, e.g., Hersch & Shinall, supra note 1, at 75-76 n. 120 (finding similar demographics
in their mTurk survey population and concluding that when the mTurk "sample differed from
the population, the direction favored the characteristics associated with decisionmakers in the
employment setting").
100.

See supra Table i.

101.
As a result, the Tables in Part IV present the responses of all subjects who participated
in the experiment.
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be male or female. Second, a finalist candidate might have an underlying
health condition that necessitated a workplace accommodation. The
principal difference between the two scenarios was the cost of the needed
accommodation: The required accommodation was costly for the employer
in scenario one, but costless in scenario two. Before turning to the details of
each scenario, however, an explanation is warranted regarding the selection
of accommodations and underlying health conditions chosen for study.
A.

VIGNETTE STUDYDESIGN

The paucity of observational human resources data regarding how
reasonable accommodation works in practice renders it an obvious candidate
for an experimental vignette study. Less obvious, however, is the population
on which such a study should focus. As many prior scholars have noted,
reasonable accommodation in the workplace may be useful to a wide range of
workers with diverse health conditions.102 The heterogeneity of these
conditions, which fall on a spectrum of severity, is multidimensional. Health
conditions may be congenital or acquired after birth, and those acquired after
birth may be voluntary (i.e., self-inflicted) or involuntary (i.e., acquired
through no action or fault of the individual). Along these lines, health
conditions may be genetically derived, environmentally derived, or some
combination of both. They may afflict an individual physically or mentally,
and their effects may be temporary or permanent. In addition, health
conditions may be immediately visible, visible over time, or invisible to thirdparty observers. 03
Given the heterogeneity of health conditions that may afflict workers,
determining where to begin studying the one-size-fits-all solution of
reasonable accommodation is difficult. Complicating this determination is
the fact that some, but not all, health conditions are already covered by the
reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA, yet the bounds of these
legislative protections remain far from clear.04 Gathering data on how
reasonable accommodation works for a wide range of health conditions
should remain a priority for researchers and will continue to be an issue with
which I grapple in future work. As a first step towards understanding
reasonable accommodation in practice, however, I choose to focus on
acquired, physical health conditions that are uncertain in terms of
redressability, voluntariness, and coverage under the ADA.
The choice to focus this initial study on such conditions is deliberate,
motivated by three overarching purposes. First, the principal concern raised

102.

See, e.g., ROBERTS &WEEKS, supranote i, at 23-53; Roberts & Leonard, supra note i, at

838-44; Stein et al., supra note i, at 693-94.
103.
For a rich discussion of the multidimensionality of health conditions, see generally
ROBERTS & WEEKS, supranote i.
See supra Section II.A.
104.
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with the reasonable accommodation model in the prior Part was ambiguity.
The uncertainty associated with what conditions must be accommodated, how
they can be accommodated, as well as the time and monetary cost of
accommodation may be driving the model's apparent, but unintended, labor
market consequences because they incite ambiguity aversion in affected
employers. The scenarios that follow in the next two Sections center on jobseekers whose weight, pregnancy, andjoint problems lead them to request an
accommodation from a potential employer. By choosing study conditions that
are uncertain in many relevant aspects-duration, redressability,
voluntariness, onerousness of accommodating, and current coverage under
the ADA, 5---the scenarios are meant to test how decisionmakers react when
they are unable to estimate multidimensional risk.
Second, conditions like weight, pregnancy, and joint problems afflict
millions of Americans and, as such, requiring reasonable accommodation for
such conditions has the potential to affect a dramatic percentage of the
workforce. Almost 40 percent of Americans aged 20 and over are classified as
obese, based on having a body mass index ("BMI") of 30 or greater.oI While
obesity on the low end of the BMI range-7 may not necessitate an
accommodation in the workplace, the likelihood of needing workplace
accommodation increases with obesity in higher BMI ranges. Between six and
eight percent of Americans have a BMI of greater than or equal to forty, which
classifies them as morbidly obese (also known as Class III or extremely
obese). ,o° Individuals in this BMI range have significantly higher rates of
developing other health problems, such as type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, and musculoskeletal conditions-which could translate to a greater
105. Another potential benefit of focusing on conditions for which current ADA coverage is
uncertain is to reduce concerns regarding the prior knowledge brought into the experiment by
subjects. If some subjects had strong background knowledge of the ADA from prior work
experience, that knowledge might color those subjects' answers to this experiment. Choosing
conditions for which background knowledge is arguably unhelpful (because coverage of these
conditions is unclear under current ADA caselaw) mitigates these concerns. (These concerns are
further mitigated by the fact that subjects with prior hiring experience, who should be the most
likely to have background knowledge of the ADA, respond in a similar manner to the two
scenarios as subjects without such experience).
1o6.
Obesity and Overweight, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2oi6), https://
(showing
[https://perma.cc/9YVS-6TFY]
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/obesity-overweight.htm
39.8 percent of American adults aged twenty and over are considered obese).
A five-feet, nine-inches tall individual would be classified as obese at a weight of 203
507.
pounds or more. See Defining Adult Overweight and Obesity, CirRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
[https://perma.cc/
PREVENTION (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/defining.html
JAK2-EBKN].
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MANAGING OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN
io8.
ADULTS: SYSTEMATIC EVIDENCE REVIEW FROM THE OBESITY EXPERT PANEL 4 (2013), available at
[https://
https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/sites/default/files/media/docs/obesity-evidence-review.pdf
perma.cc/ZEW2-QMUY]. A five-feet, nine-inches tall individual would be classified as morbidly
obese at a weight of 271 pounds or more. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra
note 107.
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need for special equipment, increased absenteeism, or impaired physical
capabilities at work.l°9
Similarly, pregnancy is an incredibly common condition: At any given
time, approximately three percent of American women are pregnant,'' ° and
86 percent of American women have given birth at some point in their lives.'
Of course, not all women will need a workplace accommodation because of
their pregnancy, but a substantial number will. Half of pregnant women, for
example, develop lower back pain,"a and may require assistance (or be
entirely prohibited from) completing certain physical tasks as a result. ,3
Likewise, joint problems represent one of the most common health
problems faced by American workers. Approximately 35 percent of men and
women with a self-reported activity limitation attributed it to arthritis or
rheumatism; another 32 percent attributed it to back or spine problems."'4
Accordingly, surgeries to restore afflicted individuals' mobility are increasing
exponentially. In 2oo9, for instance, orthopedic surgeons performed
approximately 6oo,ooo knee replacements (most of which were largely
attributable to patients' advanced osteoarthritis), but they expect to perform
over 3 million knee replacements annually by 2030.' 15
Third, common conditions like weight, pregnancy, and joint problems
have been recently targeted by advocates and legal academics as the ones in
need of additional safeguards in the workplace. In the past decade, multiple
scholars have highlighted the failure of current antidiscrimination laws to

lo9. SeeU.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note i o8, at 95 ("Patients with extreme
obesity have a high prevalence not only of complications such as CVD and type 2 diabetes but
also of nonalcoholic fatty liver disease,joint disease, sleep apnea, and thromboembolic disease.").
110.
This figure is calculated from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")
and U.S. Census Bureau numbers, which record 6.155 million pregnancies and 157.0 million
women in 20o, respectively. Age Groups and Sex: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (20o), https://
10 SFi QT
factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC
Pi&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/EJ3U-CJB8]; see also 2010 Pregnancy Rates Among U.S.
Women, CTRS.FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/
pregnancy/2oio-pregnancy-rates.htm#tablei [https://perma.cc/5SMQ-PJZ7]. The number of
pregnant women is divided by the total number of women, and then multiplied by 40/52 since
women observed in a given year were only pregnant for 40 out of 52 weeks.
Ill.
See Belinda Luscombe, No, All Those Strollers Aren't Your Imagination. More Women Are
Having Children, TIME (Jan. 19, 2o18), http://time.com/51o77o4/more-women-mothers
[https://perma.cc/J38Q-CYKP].
112.
See P. Katonis et al., Preg-nancy-RelatedLow Back Pain, 15 HIPPOKRATIA 205, 209 (201 1)
(discussing lower back problems as "one of the most common musculoskeletal complaints of
preg-nant women").
113.
For more discussion of common comorbidities of pregnancy, see Shinall, The Pregnancy
Penalty, supra note s s, at 76o.
114.
See MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DIsABILITIES: 201 o,at tbl.A2 (July 2o2), available al https://www.census.gov/library/publications/20 2/demo/p7o-i 31.html
[https://perma-cc/C 4 LX-KZ4D] (relying on Survey of Income Program Participation data).
115.
SeeDavid Ruiz,Jr. et al., The Direct and Indirect Costs to Society of TreatmentforEnd-Stage Knee
Osteoarthritis,95J. BONE &JOINT SURGERY 1473, 1473 (2013).
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protect obese individuals,- 6 pregnant women,l7 and workers with "healthrelated conduct, activities, or habits"",8 more generally and, more often than
not, their proposed legal solution is reasonable accommodation.'9 The
growing belief that vast numbers of workers with familiar, widespread health
conditions could benefit from a reasonable accommodation mandate renders
such conditions prime candidates for empirical study.120 The next Section
turns to the details of such a study, describing each scenario presented to
experimental subjects in turn.
B.

SCENARIO ONE

In scenario one, all subjects saw the following information (with
variations noted in brackets and boldface type):
Assume you work at a medium-sized wealth management firm, which
manages investment and insurance portfolios for private clients.
Your firm has a vacancy for the position of Research Analyst, and you
have been asked to rank applicants. After reviewing many
applications, you narrow the field down to two candidates,
[Amanda/Christopher] Jones and [Jennifer/Michael] Davis, and
interview both of them.
In many ways, the resumes for [Amanda/Christopher] Jones and
lennifer/Michael] Davis show similar educational background and
work histories. Both candidates received their college degrees ten
years ago from large, public universities.

116.

See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal Framework for

ProtectingObese Workers, 37 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 101, 105-o6 (2016).
117.
SeeGrossman, supra note i, at 826-27; Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: Thelnteraction
of the Pregnancy DiscriminationAct and the Amended Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 46 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 961, 1015-17 (2013) [hereinafter Widiss, Gilbert Redux]; Widiss, supra note i; see also
Shinall, The PregnancyPenalty, supra note i i, at 76o.
1 18.

Roberts & Leonard, supra note i, at 858.

1 19.

See generaUy, e.g., Grossman, supra note 1 (advocating for a reasonable accommodation

to protect employment status for pregnant women); Hersch & Shinall, supra note s (proposing
reasonable accommodation as a solution for existing mothers); Widiss, supranote s (praising new
state statutes broadening the definition of reasonable accommodation in the context of pregnant
employees); Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 117 (advocating reasonable accommodation as a
right for pregnant employees). But see Bradley A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy,67 ALA. L.
REV. 1 125, 1 164-66 (2o 16) (arguing that the expressive harms that would stem from pregnancy

accommodation would increase rather than decrease discrimination against pregnant women);
Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty, supra note i i, at 754-68 (questioning the value of reasonable

accommodation solutions to pregnancy discrimination, particularly on grounds that the ADA has
been systematically ineffective for the disabled population).
120.
Stein et al., supra note i, at 737-54 (arguing for accommodation for all in the
workplace, regardless of what drives the need for accommodation).
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[Amanda/Christopher] has a bachelor's degree in economics. Since
has worked as an Assistant
college, [Amanda/Christopher]
Researcher in a small investment firm.
[Jennifer/Michael] has a bachelor's degree in business. Since
college, lJennifer/Michael] has worked as an Assistant Analyst in a
small insurance firm.
Both candidates have strong references, and after the interviews, you
believe that you could easily work with either candidate.
Which candidate will you hire for the position of Research Analyst?
Additionally, some subjects were randomly assigned to view the following
information about one or more of the two finalist candidates:
During the interview, [Amanda/Christopher/Jennifer/Michael]
volunteers that [she/he] is [scheduled to have hip surgery in six
months/scheduled to have knee surgery in six months/three months
pregnant and, since she must have a cesarean section] will need to
take two weeks of unpaid leave. [She/He] would prefer to take less
time off work, but [her/his] doctor has insisted that two weeks of
recovery is medically necessary. In addition, [she/he] may need to
take occasional leave over the months that follow [for physical
therapy or follow-up doctor's appointments/when the baby is ill or
has follow-up doctor's appointments], but [she/he] assures you of
[her/his] commitment to make up for any lost time by working from
home.
The 25 variations of scenario one are summarized in Appendix Table 1.
In this scenario, candidates with an underlying health condition (whether
that condition was joint problems or pregnancy) requested a workplace
accommodation with a non-zero cost. Even though the candidates expressed
the need for unpaid leave, leave of any kind inevitably has some costs for an
employer. For instance, an employer may have to hire someone to cover for
an employee on leave. Even in the absence of this extra expense, leave may
also be costly for the morale of coworkers, who may resent and have to cover
for the employee on leave.
Nonetheless, scenario one tries to minimize the cost of the requested
accommodation by limiting the continuous leave portion to two weeks,
making it unpaid, and providing reassurance that the candidate is willing to
make up at least some of the employer cost by working from home. The
scenario is intended to test whether a request for a low-cost accommodation
is an impediment to workers at the hiring stage-and whether the answer to
this question depends upon either the gender of the candidate or the
underlying health condition behind the requested accommodation. Note that
the underlying health conditions, while different in nature, were deliberately
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designed to impose expected future costs to the employer that were as similar
as possible.12,

After selecting one finalist candidate to hire, subjects answered a series
of questions about their motivations in reaching their decisions, intended to
probe why (if at all) subjects were hesitant to hire a worker who required a
low-cost accommodation in the workplace. Specifically, subjects rated on a
five-point Likert scale how important the selected candidate's undergraduate
major, previous employment, likelihood of remaining with the firm,
likelihood of advancing within the firm, ability to be present in the office, and
costliness of employing were to their hiring decision. Subjects also reported
how important the preferences of firm customers and other firm employees
were to their decision.
Finally, using two follow-up questions, scenario one tested whether and
how subjects' willingness to provide a costly accommodation might have
changed once a candidate had already been hired. All subjects saw the
following two questions asking them to report their willingness to pay in order
to accommodate an existing worker.
Question i: Regardless of your answers to the prior questions, now
suppose that your firm has hired [Amanda/Christopher/
Jennifer/Michael]. Shortly after starting the job, [Amanda/
Christopher/Jennifer/Michael] asks how many weeks of medical
leave [she/he] can take in connection with [her/his] [knee
surgery/hip surgery/cesarean section]. What is the maximum
amount of medical leave you are willing to grant [Amanda/
Christopher/Jennifer/Michael]? Please select a number between o
and 16 weeks.
Question 2: During [Amanda/Christopher/Jennifer/Michael]'s
medical leave, what percent of [her/his] regular salary are you
willing to pay [her/him]? Please select a number between o and ioo
percent.
For each question, subjects reported their answers using a continuous
slider bounded by the two extreme values. Taken together, subject responses
to the questions in scenario one can provide insight into what (if any) barrier
the need for a costly accommodation imposes on a worker at the hiring stage,
as well as what (if any) barrier the need for a costly accommodation imposes
on a worker who is already on the job. These questions can help to illuminate
not only how the reasonable accommodation model is working for currently

121i.
One concern with making pregnancy an underlying health condition in this scenario is
that, in addition to signaling the need for immediate time off, it also signals the need for future,
intermittent time off to care for the child that results. In order to mitigate this concern,
candidates who needed knee or hip surgery volunteered that they too would need intermittent
time offafter their continuous two-week leave in order to attend follow-up doctors' appointments
and physical therapy.
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protected workers (i.e., disabled individuals) but also how it might work in
the future for groups of workers for whom the reasonable accommodation
model is proposed as a solution (i.e., all pregnant women and individuals with
nondisabling health conditions) .22 Scenario two seeks to answer the same set
of questions with respect to a costless workplace accommodation.
C.

SCENARIO TWO

Although workplace accommodations often come with costs, many are
costless to the employer. According to a 2013 employer interview study by the
Job Accommodation Network ('JAN"), 58 percent of disability accommodations
cost the employer nothing. Of the 42 percent of accommodations that are
costly, the median employer expenditure is 5oo dollars.' 23 Of course, which
accommodations will be costless may be difficult for an employer to predict
ex ante. Still, given the number of costless accommodations, it is important to
test subjects' reactions to workplace accommodations that are both low cost
(as in scenario one) and costless. In scenario two, in which one or more
candidates may have required a costless accommodation, all subjects saw the
following information (with variations again noted in brackets and boldface
type):
Assume you work at a medium-sized book publishing firm. Your firm
has a vacancy for the position of Copy Editor, and you have been
asked to rank applicants. A Copy Editor is responsible for
proofreading book manuscripts prior to publication. After reviewing
many applications, you narrow the field down to two candidates,
[Melissa/Daniel] Smith and [Sarah/David] Johnson, and interview
both of them.
The resumes for [Melissa/Daniel] Smith and [Sarah/David]
Johnson are similar in terms of educational background and work
histories. Both candidates received their college degrees eight years
ago from small, private universities.
[Melissa/Daniel] has a bachelor's degree in literature. Since college,
[Melissa/Daniel] has worked as an Assistant Design Editor at a small
magazine.
[Sarah/David] has a bachelor's degree in English. Since college,
[Sarah/David] has worked as an Assistant Layout Editor at a small
newspaper.

122.
123.
COST,

See supra Section III.A.
See BETH Loy, JOB AccoMMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: Low
HIGH IMPACT 3 (2015), available a! https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-

magazine/Documents/LowCostHighlmpact.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWX7-8 4 MX].
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Both candidates have strong references, and after the interviews, you
believe that you could easily work with either candidate.
Which candidate will you hire for the position of Copy Editor?
In addition, subjects were randomly assigned to view one of the three
following options about each of the finalist candidates:
During the interview, you ask if [Melissa/Daniel/Sarah/David] has
any questions about the logistics of the job.
Option 1: [Melissa/Daniel/Sarah/David]
questions about logistics.

does

not

have

any

Option 2: [Melissa/Daniel/Sarah/David] asks if large desk chairs
are available for firm employees. Due to [her/his] weight, [she/he]
is concerned about the ability of a standard-size desk chair to support
[her/him]. In fact, your firm already owns several large desk chairs,
and you inform [her/him] that it will not be a problem.
Option 3 (female candidates only): [Melissa/Sarah] asks if large
desk chairs are available for firm employees. [Melissa/Sarah] had a
baby last year and, since she never lost her pregnancy weight, she is
concerned about the ability of a standard-size desk chair to support
her. In fact, your firm already owns several large desk chairs, and you
inform her that it will not be a problem.
The 25 variations of scenario two are summarized in Appendix Table 2.
In this scenario, candidates' need for an accommodation was again derived
from their health status (i.e., their weight), although some candidates offered
an explanation for their weight (pregnancy), while others did not. Since the
accommodation of a larger chair was costless to the employer, it might be
tempting to predict a priori that any resistance expressed by subjects towards
hiring a worker in need of a costly accommodation in scenario one will
decrease or even disappear in scenario two. On the other hand, weight was
intentionally chosen as the underlying health condition in scenario two
because a long line of psychology researchs4 indicates that individuals who

124.
See, e.g., Tanya Berry & John C. Spence, Automatic Activation of Exercise and Sedentary
Stereotypes, 8o RES. Q. EXERCISE & SPORT 633, 64o app. A (2009) (documenting subject

characterizations of obese individuals as "unmotivated, lethargic, unfit, lazy, inactive, sluggish,
idle, weak, sickly, [and] loaf"); see also Tatiana Andreyeva et al., Changes in Perceived Weight
DiscriminationAmongAmericans, 1995-1996 Through 2004-2006, 16 OBESITY

1

129, 1131 (2008)

(documenting that discrimination based on weight and height is just as common as
discrimination based on race or age); Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Confronting and
Coping with Weight Stigma: An Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults, 14 OBESITY 1802, 1810
(2oo6) (finding that as BMI increases, so do reported instances of weight stigma and weight
discrimination); Rebecca M. Puhl & Kelly D. Brownell, Bias, Discrimination,and Obesity, 9 OBESI-tY

RES. 788, 8oi (2OO) (concluding that "discrimination against obese individuals is very real. It
occurs in key areas affecting health and well-being"); Mark V. Roehling, Weight-Based Discrimination
in Employment: Psychological and Legal Aspects, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 969, 983-85 (1999)
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are overweight or obese may be blamed for their condition in a way that
individuals who are pregnant or must have surgery may not be blamed.12t5
After selecting one finalist candidate to hire, subjects again answered a
series of questions about their motivations in reaching their decisions. For
scenario two, subjects rated on a five-point Likert scale how important the
selected candidate's undergraduate major, previous employment, likelihood
of remaining with the firm, likelihood of advancing within the firm, logistics
of employing, and costliness of employing were to their hiring decision.
Subjects also reported how important the preferences of firm customers and
other firm employees were to their decision.
Like scenario one, scenario two concluded by testing how subjects'
willingness to provide an accommodation might have changed once a
candidate had already been hired. All subjects saw the following question
asking them to report their willingness to pay in order to accommodate an
existing worker:
Regardless of your answers to the prior questions, now suppose your
firm has hired [Melissa/Daniel/Sarah/David]. Shortly after starting
the job, [Melissa/Daniel/Sarah/David] approaches you about
needing a large desk chair due to [her/his] weight. Although your
firm used to have spare large desk chairs in storage, you discover that
the firm has given them all away. What is the maximum amount you
are willing to spend on a large desk chair for [Melissa/Daniel/
Sarah/David]? Please select a number between $o and $i,ooo.
Subjects reported their answer to this follow-up, question using a
continuous slider between $o and $i,ooo. In sum, although scenarios one
and two are highly similar, scenario two can help provide additional insight
into subjects' willingness to accommodate workers when the accommodation
is costless and when the underlying reason for needing accommodation may
be potentially more stigmatizing. The two scenarios can also provide insight

(concluding after a review of the psychology literature that stereotypes of obese individuals as
lacking self-discipline, lazy, less conscientious, less competent, sloppy, and more likely to have a

personal problem were common).
125. This blame effect has real consequences in the workplace, particularly for overweight
and obese females. See, e.g., Shinall, supra note 1 16, at 131-34 (2016) (finding that overweight
and obese women earn less than similarly situated normal-weight women, particularly in jobs that
require interaction with the public); see also Susan Averett & Sanders Korenman, The Economic
Reality of the Beauty Myth, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 304, 306-09 (1996) (finding that obese women
ages 23 to 31 have lower family incomes than similar, normal weight women);John Cawley, The
Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39J. HUM. RESOURCES 451, 451-74 (2004) (reviewing and confirming
a long line of economics research finding that obese women earn less than normal-weight
women); Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight in Adolescence
and Young Adulthood, 3 29 NEW ENG. J. MED. oo8, 1OO9- 1i (1993) (finding that overweight
adolescents and young adults have lower household incomes in early adult life than normal
weight comparators); Jos6 A. Pagsin & Alberto Ddvila, Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and
Earnings,78 SOc. Scl. Q. 756, 757-68 (1997) (finding that obese women suffer a wage penalty).
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into how subjects' answers change, if at all, between the hiring stage and the
existing employment stage. The results from both scenarios are reported in
the next Part.
IV.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The two experimental vignette studies outlined in Part III do not directly
ask subjects about the role of ambiguity in making accommodation decisions,
yet they can provide insight into the considerations that weigh heavily on
subjects' minds in making such decisions (including ambiguity).12 6 To assess
how the reasonable accommodation model works in practice, the
experimental studies tested subjects' relative willingness to accommodate at
two critical points in the employer-employee relationship: job application and
existing employment. The experiments simulated the underlying
heterogeneity of the population protected by the ADA as well as the
uncertainty of employers' legal obligations by testing willingness to
accommodate several different health conditions that may or may not be
protected under the ADA. The experiments further used motivation
questions to assess whether productivity, costs, or some other consideration
drove subjects who were unwilling to accommodate. Most importantly, the
experiments allowed for comparison of subjects' attitudes towards
accommodation when the risks associated with a given worker are more
difficult to estimate (at the hiring stage) to when the risks are easier to
estimate (the existing employment stage). Because employers have much
more information about an existing employee-in terms of productivity,
disability (if any), and onerousness of accommodation-than ajob applicant,
the risks associated with a disabled job applicant are necessarily more
ambiguous to employers than the risks associated with an existing employee.
Tables 2 through 9 present the results from the two experimental
vignette studies outlined in Part III. The results did not depend upon whether
the job candidates viewed by subjects were male or female, nor did they
depend upon whether the subjects themselves were male or female. As a
result, the results presented in the tables below do not separate out the gender
of the job candidates or of the subjects themselves. Similarly, because the
results did not meaningfully differ between subjects who had previous hiring
experience and those who did not, the results presented below include the
responses of all subjects. The principal findings, which indicate that
uncertainty surrounding the costs of accommodation weigh heavily on
decisionmakers' minds, particularly at the job application stage, are
highlighted below.

126. Researchers conducting experimental vignette studies typically avoid asking subjects
directly about issues of interest because of concerns about priming subjects. For an example of
an ambiguity aversion experiment that also did not directly ask subjects about ambiguity (but
could nonetheless detect it), see Hersch & Shinall, supra note 1, at 54.
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A.

COsTi Y ACCOMMODATIONS IMPOSE A GRA TER BARRIER FOR
JOB APPLICANTS

Economists

have developed

discrimination-whether

based

two principal
on

theories

disability

or

to explain why

on

some

other

characteristic-exists in the labor market. First, disability discrimination may
be driven by taste-based discrimination-that is, customers', coworkers', or
employers' own distaste regarding the appearance of or association with a
disabled individual.'27 Second, disability discrimination may be driven by
statistical discrimination, or employers using observable characteristics like
disability to proxy for a worker's productivity in the absence of complete
information.' .2 Note that economic theories of taste-based discrimination and
statistical discrimination are not mutually exclusive. The former theory posits
that discrimination is driven by personal preferences unrelated to workplace
productivity or cost, while the latter theory posits that discrimination is driven
5
by employers' imperfect attempts to estimate productivity or cost. 29
Along these lines, to the extent that employers prefer not to employ
disabled workers, this preference may be based on employers' distaste for
disability, the higher costs of employing disabled workers, or some
combination

of both.

Considered

together, the

results

from

the

two

experimental studies can provide insight into how heavily the cost component
weighs on decisionmakers' minds. Comparing the results from scenario one
(the costly leave accommodation) to scenario two (the costless chair
accommodation) makes clear that requiring a costly accommodation serves
as a much greater impediment at the hiring stage than requiring a costless

127. The terms "taste-based discrimination" and "distaste for discrimination" are used here
in the same manner used by Gary Becker (and now commonly used by economists) to describe
discrimination against African-Americans in his classic 1957 work. GARYBECKER, THE ECONOMICS
OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 197 ').

128. According to the economic theory of statistical discrimination, employers use
observable traits (including protected class status) as proxies for productivity-related
characteristics-in other words, employers resort to stereotypes. For the seminal works
developing this important theory in the economics literature, see Edmund S. Phelps, The
Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659-61 (972) (using examples of
racism and sexism to develop the theory); and Kenneth J. Arrow, Models ofJob Discrimination&
Some Mathematical Models of Race in the LaborMarket, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE

83-102, 187-204 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972) (developing the theory in the context of racial
discrimination). See also Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discriminationin
Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175, 175-87 (1977) (further developing early

economic models of statistical discrimination).
129. Although statistical discrimination remains the most popular explanation for the
continuing plight of historically disadvantaged groups in the workplace, economists (and
empiricists more generally) frequently consider both theories. See generally Hersch & Shinall,
supra note j, at 75 (acknowledging that both taste-based and statistical discrimination may be at
work when evaluating historically disadvantaged groups, and attempting to hold these concerns
constant in the context of an experimental study); Shinall, The PregnancyPenalty, supra note i i,

at 754-68 (considering both cost-based and taste-based explanations for pregnant workers'
disadvantage in the workplace).
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one. Table 2 presents the hiring results for applicants with non-pregnancyrelated health conditions (i.e., the applicants who needed surgery in scenario
one and needed a large chair for their weight in scenario two); Table 3
presents the hiring results for the applicants with pregnancy-related health
conditions (i.e., the applicants who needed a cesarean section in scenario one
and needed a large chair for their post-pregnancy weight in scenario two).
Table

Scenario

2.

Probability of Hiring an Applicant with a Non-Pregnancy
Health Condition

Requested
Accommodation

When One
Applicant
Has a NonPregnancy

When One
Applicant
Has a NonPregnancy

When One Applicant
Has a NonPregnancy Health
Condition, the Other

Health

Health

Applicant Does Not

Condition

Condition,
the Other
Applicant
Hasa
Pregnancy

Need
Accommodation

Health
Condition
51.34%

I
2
*

Needs Leave for
37.86%*
31-43%*
Hip/Knee Surgery
Needs Large Chair
45.00%*
40.68%*
47.16%*
for Weight
Statistically significant difference from 5o/5o split at the 5% level

Table 3. Probability of Hiring an Applicant with a Pregnancy
Health Condition
Scenario

1
2

Requested
Accommodation

When One
Applicant
Has a
Pregnancy
Health
Comdition

When One
Applicant
Has a
Pregnancy
Health
Condition,
the Other
Applicant
Has a NonPregnancy
Health
Condition
48.66%

When One Applicant
Has a Pregnancy
Health Condition,
the Other Applicant
Does Not Need
Accomodaton

Needs Leave for
43.72%*
39.25%*
Cesarean Section
*
Needs Large Chair
54.02%*
59.32%
48.57%
for Post-Pregnancy
Weight
*Statistically significant difference from 5o/5o split at the 5% level
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Subjects were far more hesitant to hire any applicant who needed an
accommodation in scenario one (when it was costly) than in scenario two
-regardless of the applicant's underlying health condition. Looking at the
final columns of Tables 2 and 3, less than 40 percent of subjects were willing
to hire a candidate who needed a two-week, unpaid leave in six months,
whether that leave was for pregnancy- or non-pregnancy-related surgery, if the
alternative candidate did not need leave.
On the other hand, subjects exhibited far less reluctance to hire a
candidate who required the costless accommodation in scenario two. Looking
again at the final columns of Tables 2 and 3, subjects only slightly preferred
(by 5.68 percentage points) candidates who did not need an accommodation
to those who needed a chair for their non-pregnancy-related weight.
Moreover, subjects were completely indifferent between candidates who did
not need an accommodation and those who needed a chair for their
pregnancy-related weight.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that anticipated cost, more than
distaste for disability, may be principally responsible for any aversion towards
employing disabled workers. Furthermore, the results indicate job applicants
who reveal the need for an accommodation at the hiring stage may never be
given a chance by employers. Unless the applicant assures the employer that
the applicant's required accommodation will be costless, as in scenario two,
the employer may be significantly deterred from hiring the applicant when
the cost of accommodation is uncertain, but likely to be more than zero. In
scenario one, the cost associated with a brief, unpaid leave many months in
the future is uncertain, albeit probably low. Yet even this low-cost
accommodation can pose a serious barrier to job applicants. Moreover,
subjects admitted the important role of costs-both monetary and
nonmonetary-in reaching their hiring decisions, as seen in the next Section.
B.

ACCOMMODATION COSTS GIVE RISE To GREATER CONCERN THAN
DiSTASTE FORDISABILITY

After making their hiring decisions, subjects answered a series of
questions about their motivations for candidate selection, described
previously in Part III. These follow-up questions probed candidates regarding
their motivations in terms of perceived candidate qualifications (college
major, previous job, likelihood of advancing, and likelihood of remaining),
candidate fit (customer and coworker preferences), and candidate
expenditures. With respect to expenditures, subjects considered the
importance both of monetary costs and nonmonetary costs (logistics and
presence in workplace) associated with the job candidates. The results in
Tables 4 through 7 reaffirm the conclusions of the prior Section: Subjects
admitted their concerns over the costs, both monetary and nonmonetary, of
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accommodating a job candidate, but expressed less concern over how
employing a disabled worker might look, or their distaste for disability. 30
Table 4 reports the percent of subjects who ranked a motivation for
selection as important or very important on a five-point Likert scale for

scenario one; Table 5 reports the same figures for scenario two. Both tables
report these percentages for all subjects, subjects who hired a worker with a
non-pregnancy-related health condition, and subjects who hired a worker
with a pregnancy-related health condition. A strong majority of all subjects
rated the candidate qualification motivations as important. Yet because almost
everyone selected qualification motivations as important, this selection
seemed to have little influence on which candidate was ultimately selected.,3
Note in Tables 4 and 5 that the percentages selecting college major, previous
job, and likelihood of remaining and advancing are consistent across
columns, regardless of whom the subject eventually decided to hire.
Concerns about customers' and coworkers' tastes for disability were
significantly less important to the subjects than candidate qualifications, with
less than 40 percent of subjects rating these motivations as important in the
two scenarios. Moreover, as with the qualification motivations, little
relationship seems to exist between rating customer or coworker preferences
as important and the candidate hired. Notice again that the percent of
subjects selecting coworker and customer preferences as important are
relatively consistent across columns, whether or not the subject decided to
hire a candidate who needed an accommodation. These observations from
Tables 4 and 5 hold in the analyses presented in Tables 6 and 7, which regress
a subject's decision to hire a worker in need of accommodation on the
subject's important motivations. The relative lack of importance subjects
assigned to customer and coworker preferences casts doubt on theories that
subjects avoid hiring workers in need of accommodation primarily because
they do not like how disability looks or are worried about their own or others'
distaste for disability.

130.

See supra Section IVA and Tables 2, 3-

131.
In all likelihood, the lack of candidate qualifications' explanatory power is due to the
fact that the finalist candidates were intentionally designed to be highly similar and
interchangeable.
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Table 4. Percent of Subjects Who Reported Motivation as Important or Very
Important to Hiring Decision in Leave Scenario (Question i)
All Subjects
................
College Major
Previous job
Likelihood of
Remaining
Likelihood of
Advancing
Presence in Workplace
Cost
Customer Preferences

Coworker Preferences
N

__

Subjects Who Hired
a Worker Needing

Subjects Who Hired
a Pregnant Worker

_ _Surgery

71.86%
8,3.48%
73.54%

72.28%

73.76%

81.84%
72.72%

85.o%
75.72%

62.38%

6o.97%

61.51%

63.74%
46.98%
39.73%

54.63%
42.59%
38.56%
31.49%
2,731

50.94%
39.96%
39.96%
30.16%
1,429

32.02%

8,070

Table 5. Percent of Subjects Who Reported Motivation as Important or Very
Important to Hiring Decision in Chair Accommodation
Scenario (Question 2)
All Subjects

Subjects Who Hired a
Worker with an
Unspecified Weight

Subjects Who Hired
a Worker with
Pregnancy Weight

Condition
College Major
Previous Job
Likelihood of
Remaining
Likelihood of
Advancing
Logistics
Cost
Customer
Preferences
Coworker
Preferences
N

78.65%
83".52%
68.oo%

79.85%
84.27%
67.71%

78.42%
83.93%
69.o9%

58.43%

56.42%

58.94%

49.60%
4.88%
39.42%

44.97%
3g.6o%
37.37%

49-33%
41.88%
38.77%

34.35%

32.66%

35.48%

8,070

3,013

1,705
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Table 6. Effect of Important/Very Important Subject Motivations in
Willingness to Hire a Worker Needing Surgery or Pregnant Worker in
Question 1 (Leave Scenario)

College Major
Previous Job
Likelihood of Remaining
Likelihood of Advancing

(1)

()

Change in Probabi ity of
Hiring a Candidate Needing
Surgery

Change in Probabilty of
Hiring a Pregnant Candidate
2.22

2.55

7.98***

-i.o6
5.69**
3.28*.

7"29**

-1.09
-28.52***
-7 92***
9.9***

-23.84***
-7 63***
0.40

Presence in Workplace
Cost
Customer Preferences
Coworker Preferences

N

0.75

-0.17

3,8o6

2,587

*2<o.1 **p<005 ***p<o.o

Notes: Reported results report percentage point change estimates from a linear probability
regression of hiring decision on important/very important subject motivations. Regressions
in column (s) include subjects who only saw one candidate who needed surgery (where the
other candidate was pregnant or had no underlying health condition). Regressions in
column (2) include subjects who only saw one pregnant candidate (where the other
candidate needed surgery or had no underlying health condition).

Table 7. Effect of Important/Very Important Subject Motivations in
Willingness to Hire a Worker with a Weight Condition in Question 2
(Chair Accommodation Scenario)

College Major
Previous Job
Likelihood of Remaining
Likelihood of Advancing
Logistics
Cost

(i)
Change in Probability of Hiring
a Worker with an Unspecified
Weight Condition
3.30
6.94**
6-43***
-3.12
-4.69**
-13"44***

(z)
Change in Probability of
Hiring a Pregnancy Weight
Worker
3. 16
-1.66
-o.66
o.38
0.1 1
-1056**

Customer Preferences

-o.64

2.12

Coworker Preferences
N

0.04

1.25

2,551
3,880
*p<o. I **p<O.05 ***p<O.OI
Notes: Reported results report percentage point change estimates from a linear probability
regression of hiring decision on important/very important subject motivations. Regressions
in column (1) include subjects who only saw one candidate who had an unspecified weight
condition (where the other candidate had not lost her pregnancy weight or had no
underlying health condition). Regressions in column (2) include subjects who only saw one
pregnancy weight candidate (where the other candidate needed had an unspecified weight
condition or had no underlying health condition).

In contrast, Tables 6 and 7 make clear that cost-related motivations were
strongly associated with a subjects' ultimate hiring decision. Monetary costs
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were undoubtedly influential in subjects' selection of a candidate to hire:
Subjects who rated costs as important in scenario one (in which the requested
accommodation was costly) were about eight percentage points less likely to
hire a worker with any type of health condition. Even though they did not
have to purchase the requested accommodation in the hiring portion of
scenario two (since the employer already owned a large chair), subjects who
selected costs as an important motivation in this scenario were 13.44
percentage points less likely to hire a worker with a non-pregnancy-related
weight condition and 10.56 percentage points less likely to hire a worker with
a pregnancy-related weight condition.
Along these lines, the results from subjects' identified motivations
suggest that concerns about nonmonetary costs deterred subjects from hiring
workers in need of accommodation at least as much as monetary costs. In
scenario two, subjects worried about logistics were 4.69 percentage points less
likely to hire a non-pregnant worker in need of accommodation. More
strikingly, in scenario one, subjects who valued presence in the workplace
were 23.84 percentage points less likely to hire a non-pregnant worker in
need of an accommodation and 28.52 percentage points less likely to hire a
pregnant worker in need of an accommodation. Indeed, subject concerns
about a worker's ability to be present had, by far, the greatest predictive value
in whether that subject avoided hiring a candidate in need of an
accommodation.
Taken together, the results in Tables 4 through 7 indicate that the
nonmonetary-and arguably, more uncertain-costs associated with
accommodating a worker weigh at least as heavily on employers' minds as
more directly quantifiable monetary costs associated with purchasing an
accommodation. Although such concerns may constrain the opportunities of
all workers who request an accommodation at the hiring stage, they impose a
greater constraint on workers with particular types of health conditions, which
is discussed in the next Section.
C.

THE UNDERLYING CONDITION CAN AFFECT WILLINGNESS
TO ACCOMMODATE

As discussed in Section II.A, the ADA covers a limitless range of health
conditions and, as a result, targets a population far more heterogeneous than
do other antidiscrimination statutes. Along these lines, the ADA does not
differentiate between the vastly different underlying health conditions that it
covers: As long as a worker can demonstrate that she is substantially limited in
a major life activity, she is entitled to accommodation under the Act.132 It

should not matter whether she is limited in all or only some of her major life

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)( 5 )(A) (2012) (defining disability discrimination as "not
132.
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability").

662

IOWA LAWPREVIEW

[Vol. 105:621

activities; in theory, a worker with carpal tunnel syndrome can be just as
entitled to the ADA's protections as a worker in a wheelchair.'a3 It also should
not matter whether her limitation arises from a self-inflicted health condition
or one over which she has no control; in theory, a worker in a wheelchair due
to her own reckless driving is just as entitled to the ADA's protections as a
worker in a wheelchair due to a congenital condition.'34
Nonetheless, from an employer's perspective, different health conditions
may give rise to different attitudes and present vastly different challenges. Not
only may the accommodation for some health conditions be costlier than
others, but, more fundamentally, determining how to accommodate some
health conditions may be costlier than others. Employers may also have strong
preconceived notions about certain health conditions and believe that they
signal underlying qualities about workers afflicted by them.,35 Moreover, as
discussed in Section IL.A, some conditions are more familiar to employers
than others, and some conditions may be more uniformly symptomatic than
others. In other words, employers may not only view certain health conditions
as riskier than others, they may also view certain health conditions as more
ambiguous than others.

The resulting difference in willingness to accommodate workers
depending upon the underlying health condition is reflected in the results
from the experimental vignette studies. In scenario one, the requested
accommodation was the same-two weeks of unpaid leave and intermittent
leave thereafter-regardless of whether the worker needed joint surgery or a
cesarean section. Similarly, in scenario two, the requested accommodation, a
large chair, should have arguably been the same from an employer's
perspective since the employer already owned the chair. But Tables 2 and 3
indicate that subjects were somewhat more willing to provide pregnancyrelated accommodations than non-pregnancy-related accommodations.
This greater willingness to accommodate a pregnancy-related condition
is more obvious in the results from scenario two. As seen in Table 3, subjects
given the choice between a candidate who needed a large chair because of

133. In other words, severity of the underlying condition should not matter for
accommodation once an individual meets the substantially limited threshold. Although
individuals in wheelchairs may have been more along the lines of whom Congress had in mind
to protect with the passage of the ADA, carpal tunnel syndrome has been the subject of several
ADA suits involving workers who had to type in their jobs-most notably, Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002),
Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.

superseded by statute, ADA

134. In other words, voluntariness of the underlying condition should not matter for
accommodation once an individual meets the substantially limited threshold. For a discussion of
the voluntariness doctrine in employment discrimination law, see Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting
Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VIIJurisprudence, 92 KY. LJ.
483, 515 (2003).

135. A classic association is obesity and laziness. See, e.g., Roehling, supra note 124
(documenting subjects' associations of obesity with laziness in the experimental setting).
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pregnancy weight and one who needed a large chair because of an
unspecified weight condition preferred the pregnancy weight candidate
approximately 6o percent of the time. Subjects were also indifferent between
hiring candidates who needed a chair accommodation because of pregnancy
weight and candidates who needed no accommodation at all. Contrast the
results in Table 2, which indicate that subjects still slightly preferred
candidates who needed no accommodation to candidates who needed a chair
accommodation because of an unspecified weight condition.
The preference for accommodating workers with a pregnancy-related
condition is visible in scenario one as well, albeit less apparent. When given
the choice between a candidate in need of surgery and a candidate without a
need, 39-25 percent of subjects hired the candidate in need of pregnancyrelated surgery, but only 31.43 percent of subjects hired the candidate in
need of non-pregnancy-related surgery. Still, subjects presented with a
pregnancy-related surgery candidate and a non-pregnancy-related surgery
candidate expressed no statistically significant preference between them.
Several factors may explain why subjects preferred accommodating
pregnancy over other types of health conditions. Subjects may hold more
positive priors, or less stigma, towards pregnancy than towards other health
conditions.3 6 Pregnancy is the precursor to bringing a child into the world
(which for many, is ajoyous event), and as noted in Section III.B, remains an
incredibly common experience.137 On the other hand, pregnancy may not be
a uniformly positive signal, particularly for employers, since many women will
take leave from theirjob, require more flexibility from theirjob, or drop out
8
of the labor market altogether because of pregnancy and childbirth.3

136. Economist Marjorie Baldwin has conducted pioneering research demonstrating the
different levels of stigma attached to different health conditions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, wage
and employment gaps are similarly heterogeneous (with the most stigmatized workers
experiencing the largest wage and employment gaps). See generallyMARJORIE L. BALDWIN, BEYOND
SCHIZOPHRENIA: LIVING AND WORKING WITH A SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (2016) (demonstrating

that mentally ill individuals fare worse than other disabled individuals in the labor market);
Marjorie L. Baldwin & Chung Choe, Wage DiscriminationAgainst Workers with Sensory Disabilities,53
INDUS. REL. 101 (2014) (documenting different disability penalties for workers with sensory

disabilities than for workers with physical disabilities); Marjorie L. Baldwin & Steven C. Marcus,
The Impact of Mental and Substance-Use Disorders on Employment Transitions, 23 HEALTH ECON. 332
[hereinafter Baldwin & Marcus, The Impact of Mental and Substance-Use Disorders on

(2014)

Employment Transitions] (providing evidence that individuals with substance-use disorders are
more likely to transition out of unemployment, but individuals with mental illness are less likely
to transition out of unemployment); Marjorie L. Baldwin & Steven C. Marcus, Perceived and
Measured Stigma Among Workers with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 388 (2oo6)
(finding evidence of high levels of perceived and actual stigma against workers with mood,
anxiety, and psychotic disorders).
137. Almost nine out of every ten women have given birth. See Luscombe, supra note 1 1 1.
138. For a discussion of the short-term and long-term effects of pregnancy, and the resulting
signals to employers, see Shinall, The PregnancyPenalty, supra note i1,at 754-68.
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Along these lines, subjects' preference for accommodating pregnant
workers may simply be the result of greater familiarity with pregnancy
-especially when compared to the relative unfamiliarity of the other health
conditions in the vignette studies. Fifty-eight percent of female subjects in the
mTurk sample report ever having been pregnant, and 53 percent of the entire
sample have children living in their household-suggesting that at least half
of subjects are well acquainted with pregnancy and childbirth.39 As a result,
the costs associated with accommodating a currently or recently pregnant
worker may have seemed less uncertain than the costs associated with
accommodating a worker with another health condition.,4o
More critically, recall from Part III that, except in the case of pregnancy,
subjects did not know what the underlying health condition was for the other
workers in need of accommodation. Subjects knew the worker would need
joint surgery or a larger chair because of weight, but unless the worker was
pregnant, subjects did not know what caused the need forjoint surgery or the
weight gain. Nor is this lack of information on the decisionmaker's part
unrealistic at the hiring stage; as discussed in Section II.A, the ADA strictly
prohibits employers from making "inquiries of ajob applicant as to whether
such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity
of such disability" before making an employment offer.'4' The Act limits
employer's questions to inquiries regarding "the ability of an applicant to
perform job-related functions" at the interview stage so that an employer will
not know the precise nature of an applicant's health condition (unless the
applicant volunteers this information). ,42
Consequently, in its current form, the ADA may perpetuate, and even
heighten, ambiguity with respect to job applicants. If an employer discovers
at the interview stage that a job applicant will require an accommodation
-- either through the visibility of the applicant's condition or the applicant
volunteering the information-the Act severely constrains the type of follow139. Here, I cautiously estimate that at least half the sample is very familiar with pregnancy
since not all women who have been pregnant were able to carry to term (or for more than a few
weeks), and subjects may have nonbiological children living in their household as the result of
marriage or adoption. On the other hand, this estimate may understate the number of subjects
highly familiar with pregnancy since subjects may have experience with close friends' or family
members' pregnancies.
140. Interestingly, however, subjects who had previously been pregnant or had children were
not more generous in their willingness to pay for accommodations for existing workers. See infra
Appendix Table 3.
141.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012); see also Pre-Employment Inquiries and Medical
Questions & Examinations, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/practices/inquiries-medical.cfm [https://perma.cc/LE3 C-Q6GU] ("An employer may not
ask ajob applicant, for example, if he or she has a disability (or about the nature of an obvious
disability). An employer also may not ask ajob applicant to answer medical questions or take a
medical exam before making ajob offer. An employer may ask ajob applicant whether they can

perform the job and how they would perform thejob.").
142. 4 2 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
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up questions the employer may ask about the condition. Arguably, the Act
does not even permit an employer to ask the name of the employee's
diagnosis.' 43 Although intended to protect disabled workers, these constraints
prevent employers from proxying the risk associated with hiring such workers
and leave employers in a state of ambiguity with respect to them.
In sum, currently and recently pregnant workers who needed
accommodation in these experiments may have had better outcomes than
other workers who needed accommodation-not because they were
pregnant, but because subjects knew the underlying health condition driving
their need for accommodation. As a result, subjects were better able to assess
the underlying risk associated with hiring a worker disabled by pregnancy
than a worker disabled by an unknown health condition. The results
presented in the next Section, which examines subjects' willingness to
accommodate workers post-offer, strengthen the conclusion that ambiguity
may be responsible for much of the aversion exhibited towards disabled
workers (particularly, disabled workers with unknown health conditions) at
the pre-offer stage.
D.

ACCOMMODA TION IMPOSES A GiEATERL BAR1IERiR

JOB APPLICANTS

THAN EXISTING EMPLOYEES

Even though job applicants who needed accommodation because of
pregnancy may have fared better than other applicants who needed
accommodation, subjects overall preferred applicants who did not volunteer
the need for accommodation before hiring. This result, combined with
subjects' expressed concerns about the nonmonetary and monetary costs of
accommodation, may at first suggest subjects' total opposition to the ADA
employer-funded reasonable accommodation model. Yet subjects' answers to
questions about willingness to accommodate workers after hiringindicates that
the idea of employer-funded accommodation need not be completely
scrapped. As seen below in Tables 8 and 9, subjects expressed far more
willingness to accommodate existing workers than job candidates.
Tables 8 and 9 present subjects' willingness to pay for an accommodation
after a worker had been hired in scenarios one and two, respectively. Turning
first to Table 8, subjects' reported willingness to accommodate hired workers
with leave was surprisingly generous-much more generous than any leave
asked for by job candidates prior to being hired. On average, subjects were
willing to grant about four weeks of leave to existing workers in need of nonpregnancy-related surgery and about six weeks of leave to existing workers in
143.

Cf U.S.

EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: ENFORCEMENT

GU IDANCE ON DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAM INATIONS UNDER THE AMERICANS

available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qandaACT (ADA),
DISABILITIES
inquiries.html [https://perma.cc/3UBZ-DQ2U] ("[P]rior to an offer of employment[], an
employer may not ask any disability-related questions or require any medical examinations, even
if they are related to thejob.").
WITH
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need of pregnancy-related surgery. More remarkably, subjects expressed a
willingness to pay existing workers over half of their salary while out on leave.
Subjects' willingness to pay was again more generous for pregnant workers
(62.74 percent of salary) than for nonpregnant workers (56.72 percent of
salary). Table 9 demonstrates a similar generosity towards existing workers
not seen in the prior questions about job candidates at the hiring stage.
Regardless of the reason why the worker needed a large chair in scenario two,
subjects expressed willingness to pay about $300 for the accommodation. The
generosity exhibited towards existing workers does not appear to be driven by
subjects' prior experience or empathy effects: Appendix Table 3
demonstrates that subjects who had prior experience with pregnancy,
disability, or weight gain were typically no more generous in their willingness
to accommodate existing workers than their less experienced peers.
Table 8. Average Willingness to Provide Accommodation in Question i
(Leave Scenario)
Wlingness to Provide A commodation
for a Worker Needing Surgery

Number of

Willingness to Provide Aecommodation
for a Pregnant Worker

Subjects
Who
Viewed a
Pregnant
Candidate
6.44

Subjects
Who Hired
a Pregnant
Candidate

4.56

Subjects
Who
Rejected a
Surgery
Candidate
4-37

7.05

Subjects
Who
Rejected a
Pregnant
Candidate
5.97

57.93%

55.98%

62.74%

68.oo%

58.65%

Subjects
Who
Viewed a
Surgery
Candidate
4.44

Subjects
Who Hired
a Surgery
Candidate

56.72%

Weeks of

Leave
Percentage
of Pay
During
Leave

1,131
1,456
2,365
2,587
3,806
1,441
N
Notes: Surgery candidate estimates include subjects who only saw one candidate who needed surgery
(where the other candidate was pregnant or had no underlying health condition). Pregnant
candidate estimates include subjects who only saw one pregnant candidate (where the other
candidate needed surgery or had no underlying health condition).
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Table 9. Average Willingness to Provide Accommodation in Question
(Chair Accommodation Scenario)
W'dlingness to Provide Accommodation

Price

2

Wilfingnes to Provide Acconimodation for

Because of Unspecified Weight Condition
Subjects
Subjects
Subjects
Who
Who
Who Hired
Viewed an
an
Rejected an

Subjects
Who
Viewed a

Pregnancy Weight
Subjects Who
Subjects
Rejected a
Who
Hired a
Pregnancy Weight

Unspecified
Weight

Unspecified
Weight

Unspecified
Weight

Pregnancy
Weight

Pregnancy
Weight

Candidate

Candidate

Candidate

Candidate

Candidate

$315.27

$344.61

$291.26

$305.32

$316.45

Candidate

$292.25

of
Desk
Chair
1
,173
1, 746
2,134
2,551
5,378
N
I
Notes: Unspecified weight candidate estimates include subjects who only saw one candidate who had
an unspecified weight condition (where the other candidate had not lost her pregnancy weight or
had no underlying health condition). Pregnancy weight candidate estimates include subjects who only
saw one pregnancy weight candidate (where the other candidate had an unspecified weight condition
or had no underlying health condition).

Still, perhaps the most surprising result from Tables 8 and 9 is the small
variation in responses between the subjects who had previously hired and
those who had previously rejected ajob candidate in need of accommodation.
Subjects who had rejected ajob candidate in need of a non-pregnancy-related
leave were nonetheless willing to grant an existing worker 4.37 weeks of leave
at 55.98 percent of normal pay (compared to subjects who had previously
hired such candidates, who were willing to grant an existing worker 4.56
weeks of leave at 57.93 percent of normal pay). The difference between the
two groups of subjects was bigger for pregnancy-related conditions-subjects
who had previously hired pregnant workers were about one week and ten
percent of pay more generous with existing pregnant workers. Yet subjects
who had rejected a pregnant worker in the prior question were still willing to
grant an existing pregnant worker 5.97 weeks of leave at 58.65 percent of
normal pay.
The differences between subjects who had previously hired and those
who had previously rejected ajob candidate in need of accommodation were
even smaller for scenario two. Subjects who had previously rejected a job
candidate who needed a chair for an unspecified weight condition were
willing to pay up to $291.26 for a chair once that candidate had been hired
(compared to subjects who had previously hired the candidate, who were
willing to pay up to $344.61). Moreover, subjects who had previously rejected
ajob candidate who needed a chair for post-pregnancy weight were willing to
pay up to $292.25 for a chair once that candidate had been hired (compared
to subjects who had previously hired the candidate, who were willing to pay
up to $316.45).
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Taken together, the results presented in this Section provide what is
arguably the most important and novel insight of this experiment: The ADA's
failure to improve wage and employment outcomes of disabled individuals
over the past three decades may be principally due to barriers to entry at the

hiring stage. Even the subjects who avoided workers in need of an
accommodation at the hiring stage expressed ample willingness to
accommodate these same workers once they had been hired. Questions then
arise regarding what creates these barriers to entry, and how accommodation
legislation can be constructed to reduce such barriers.
Beginning to answer such questions requires stepping back to consider
what distinguishes job candidates from existing employees. As discussed in
Section II.A, job candidates present a great deal more uncertainty to
employers than do existing employees. At the hiring stage, employers can only
guess how productive a worker will be based on her credentials and
information revealed during an interview. Job candidates who reveal the need
for accommodation during an interview (whether voluntarily or involuntarily)
risk adding to this uncertainty, particularly if employers remain in the dark
about their underlying health condition, as the ADA currently both allows and
encourages. Employers who have incomplete information about a job
candidate's health condition will have difficulty estimating how needed the
requested accommodation is, how helpful it will be, how sufficient a solution
it will be, and, at bottom, how much additional cost (if any) hiring a disabled
candidate will introduce as a result of accommodation.
Once a worker has been hired, however, the employer should be better
able to estimate the answer to all these questions. For both disabled and
nondisabled workers, the employer has more accurate information regarding
their expected productivity from personal experience. For disabled workers,
the employer also has more accurate information regarding the expected cost
of accommodating the worker from personal experience. Moreover, the
current reasonable accommodation model allows employers to sharpen their
accommodation cost estimates at the post-offer stage by permitting employers
to collect additional information regarding the worker's medical condition.' 44
That allowance is notably absent, however, at the pre-offer stage-when
employers could arguably benefit most from additional information. ,45
In sum, the costs and benefits associated with hiring ajob candidate are
inherently uncertain. The costs become even more uncertain when an
employer knows that ajob candidate has a health condition that necessitates
an accommodation, but the employer lacks full information on that health
condition. Because the ADA restricts information flow regarding a worker's
underlying health condition at the hiring stage, it may undermine, instead of

144. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (4) (A) (permitting post-offer medical examinations that are
"job-related and consistent with business necessity").
145. See id. (prohibiting pre-offer medical examinations).
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encourage, employers from taking a chance on disabled workers. As a result,
reforms to the ADA must focus on making any risks associated with hiring a
disabled worker easier for employers to estimate and, in turn, less ambiguous.
Such reforms are considered in Part V.
V.

IMPROVING THE

ADA

The results from the experiment discussed in the prior Part indicate that
the shortfalls of the ADA may be most severe at the hiring stage and
substantially driven by the ambiguity it perpetuates regarding the costs of
accommodating a disabled worker. As a result, this Part considers how the
ADA can best be reformed to reduce, instead of promote, employer
uncertainty at the hiring stage with respect to protected workers. The ADA
has disappointed its targeted population-workers substantially limited in a
major life activity'4 6-long enough, and the reasonable accommodation
model certainly must be reformed before being exported to other legislation
aimed at protecting other disadvantaged groups, such as pregnant workers,
caretakers, and workers with nondisabling health conditions.47
A.

AGAINST RESTRICTING CONVERSATIONS ATHIRING

Because subjects expressed much more reluctance towards workers
needing accommodation at the hiring stage than at the employment stage,
one potential remedy to the current version of the ADA may be to completely
bar pre-employment discussions about disability. Yet, as previously discussed,
the ADA already has some protections built into the statute to limit the scope
of pre-employment conversations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d) (2) states:
[A] covered entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make
inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such
disability.... A covered entity may make pre-employment inquiries
into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions. 48
As currently written, this section prevents employers from asking job
applicants if they are disabled, inquiring about their health conditions, or
requiring a medical examination ofjob applicants before making an offer of
employment. But this section does not prohibit discussions about a disability
or other health conditions that are volunteered by the applicant.' 49 Recall that

146.

See supra note 4 and accompanying text-

147.

See supranotes 115-19 and accompanying text.

148. 4 2 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2).
149. Note that courts evaluating this section of the Act have made clear that information
unnecessarily volunteered by workers with respect to their health status does not enjoy the
protections of42 U.S.C. § 12112. See, e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Thrivent Fin. for
Lutherans, 7oo F. 3 d 1O44, 1052 ( 7 th Cir. 2o12)

(finding that a worker who unnecessarily
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in both of the experimental scenarios presented in the last Part, the job
applicants revealed information (albeit incomplete information) about their
health statuses during the interview without solicitation from the employer.
Because the experimental results indicate that pre-offer discussions
about both the need for an accommodation and the nature of the required
accommodation substantially reduce an applicant's chances of receiving ajob
offer, it may be tempting to conclude that the best solution is barring such
pre-offer discussions altogether. Yet there are reasons to be skeptical about
the efficacy of this potential fix to the ADA. Even if pre-offer conversations
about disability were totally barred at the interview stage, this bar would not
help workers with visible disabilities. In order to take considerations about
disability completely off the table at an in-person interview,job applicants with
visible disabilities would need to hide their condition. Not only would a policy
that encouraged hiding disability pre-offer be unworkable (if not impossible)
for many applicants, it would also raise serious ethical concerns about
deception. Not to mention that encouraging applicants to hide information
from potential employers could undermine the foundation of the employeremployee relationship from the outset.
Intentionally hiding a disability from an employer is fraught with
problems, yet not hiding a disability in the presence of a pre-offer conversation
bar would place workers with visible disabilities in a particularly precarious
position. An employer interviewing an applicant with a visible disability may
worry about her ability to perform essential job functions, but not be able to
ask any questions that would quell these worries. Along these lines, a worker
with a visible disability may be fully capable of performing essential job
functions-with or without an accommodation-but a complete conversation
bar would prevent the worker from even volunteering such information to the
employer.
Because disability conversation bars during in-person interviews are
unworkable for applicants with visible disabilities, another possible solution
that emerges is curtailing or restricting the use of in-person interviews. One
potential model for restricting interviews in order to reduce bias is the blind
orchestra audition. Two decades ago, Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse
famously demonstrated that using a screen to blind judges to musicians'
appearance during auditions narrowed the gender disparity in callbacks.150 In
a similar manner, the law could require employers to use a screen during
interviews to blind themselves to the appearance ofjob applicants, which may
not only reduce bias experienced by individuals with visible disabilities but
also bias experienced by members of other historically disadvantaged groups.

volunteered information about his migraine condition to an employer had not responded to a
medical inquiry and thus did not enjoy the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 12112).
i5o. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2ooo).
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Yet again, this solution is not a complete one. An applicant with a hearing
impairment, for example, would not be aided by the use of a screen that
blocked her appearance. Still a more restrictive law might ban the use of inperson interviews altogether, but this solution would certainly be opposed by
employers, particularly (and rightfully) for public-facing jobs that require
strong communication and interpersonal skills.
For all the above reasons, any policy attempt to totally prohibit employers
from finding out about a job applicant's disability-whether in the form of
screens, conversation bars, or interview bans-cannot be a complete solution
for every disabled worker. The workers who would necessarily slip through
the cracks (and could not successfully hide their disability from the employer
at the interview phase) would arguably find themselves at a greater
disadvantage than they already face. Indeed, these job candidates might find
themselves the ultimate victims of ambiguity aversion. An employer who knew
that ajob applicant was disabled based on appearances-but was neither able
to ask any clarifying questions about it, nor able to consider volunteered
information from the applicant about it-would necessarily view that
applicant's condition as uncertain. The precise nature of the disabled
applicant's condition, the severity of the applicant's condition, the applicant's
need for an accommodation, the applicant's ability to perform essential job
functions, and whether any of the foregoing concerns rendered a visibly
disabled job candidate riskier than other job candidates would all remain
ambiguous to the employer.'5' As a result, the theory of ambiguity aversion, a
theory borne out in the disability context by the experiment presented in the
prior Part, predicts that the employer would avoid that applicant in favor of a
less ambiguous one.
A further, and more fundamental, reason exists to be concerned about
policies that attempt to shut off information flow between employers and
employees at the interview stage: job matching. Here, I use the term job
matching in the same way commonly used by economists to signify the fit

151.
Critics of the above characterization of employers' avoidance in hiring workers with
known disabilities may dispute whether such avoidance is more accurately described as risk, rather
than ambiguity, aversion. For the reasons already explained in Section I.B.i, I argue that
ambiguity aversion provides the more accurate characterization of employers' treatment ofjob
candidates with known disabilities. Job candidates are inherently risky, regardless of their
disability status. Moreover, because many health conditions have no bearing on an individual's
ability to do her job and require no accommodation on the part of the employer, a job
candidate's known health condition may present no more risk to the employer than any other
known characteristic about the candidate. The fundamental problem here is the inability of
employers to estimate the risk (if any) associated with hiring a disabled job candidate with any
accuracy, which the current structure of the ADA exacerbates at the pre-offer stage by reducing
information flow. Finally, regardless of how employers' avoidance of hiring disabled job
candidates is properly described, the solution suggested in the next two Sections, which is based
on the experimental vignette study results, will hold.
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between an applicant's skills and a job's requirements.152 Economists have
repeatedly documented that employment relationships end more quickly
when employer and employee expectations are misaligned-that is, when
there is job mismatch.'s3 Policies that restrict information flow necessarily
impede the ability of employers and employees to determine whether their
expectations are indeed aligned and, consequently, promotejob mismatch.54
Job mismatch is highly costly for both employers and employees. For
employers, job mismatch increases turnover costs, which include the costs of
searching for and retraining a new worker.,55 For lower-skill positions,
turnover costs average between io and 30 percent of the cost of the worker's
annual salary,'5 6 but may be as much as double the worker's annual salary for

152.

For exampleg of the broad economics literature on job matching, see generally, Jim

Allen & Rolf van der Velden, Educational Mismatches Versus Skill Mismatches: l'2ffects on Wages, Job
Satisfaction, and On-the-Job Search, 53 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 434 (200) (examining educational

and skill mismatches); Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, The Incidence and Wage Effects of
Overeducatio, s ECON. EDUC. REv. 75 (1981) (discussing job matching in the context of excess
education); Joni Hersch, Optimal 'Mismatch' and Promotions, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 611 (1995)
(considering the value of overqualified employees); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory

of Turnover,J. POL. ECON. 972 (1979) (highlighting the relationship between employee turnover
and educational and skill mismatches); Nachum Sicherman, "Overeducation" in the LaborMarket,
9 J. LAB. ECON. 101 (1991) (highlighting the reasons for employee educational and skill
mismatches); Richard R. Verdugo & Naomi Turner Verdugo, The Impact of Surplus Schooling on
Earnings, 24J. HUM. RESOURCES 629, 629 (1989)

(examining job matching in the context of

surplus education).
153. For a discussion of the job mismatch literature, see Hersch, supra note 152 (noting that
a "substantial proportion of workers are employed in jobs for which they appear to be either
overqualified or underqualified," and these mismatched workers are more likely to part ways with
the empl6yer).
154.
See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Employment Relationships with Joint Employer and Worker
Experimentation, 24 INT'L ECON. REv. 313 (1983) (analyzing how the job matching process

involves uncertainties on behalf of the worker and the employer that only get resolved over time,
leading to turnover for unsuccessful matches); W. Kip Viscusi, Job Hazards and Worker Quit Rates:
An Analysis ofAdaptive Worker Behavior,20 INT'L ECON. REV. 29 (1979) (showing that workers who

learn theirjob is riskier than expected are more likely to quit).
155.
Managingfor Employee Retention, SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., https://www.shrm.org/
resourcesandtools/tools-and-sam ples/tool kits/pages/managingforemployeeretention.aspx
("Turnover costs can have a significant negative impact on a company's performance."); see also
Mike Kappel, 5 Ways to Reduce Employee Turnover, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:o9 AM), https://

www.forbes.com/sites/mikekappel/ 2017/o8/09/5-ways-to-reduce-employee-turnover
[https://
perma.cc/HGX 9 -NE84 ] ("When employees leave, it's costly for your business. It takes time and
money to find and train a replacement. That's why it's best for businesses to reduce their turnover
as much as possible.").
156.

See Heather Boushey & Sarah Jane Glynn, There Are Signiicant Business Costs to Replacing

Employees, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. i6, 2012, 3:44 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/economy/reports/2 012/1 1/ 16/44464/there-are-significant-business-coststo-replacing-employees [https://perma.cc/L 4 RM-8B9S] ("Looking only at estimates of the cost
of turnover for workers earning, on average, $75,000 per year or less, 17 case studies find a cost
of turnover in the range of i o percent to 30 percent.").
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higher-skill

positions.,57 For employees, job

mismatch

increases job

displacement costs, which include the costs associated with searching for a
newjob, surviving an uncertain period of income instability, and coping with
lifetime earnings losses.,58 Indeed, job mismatch may be particularly
devastating for individuals with a disability, who, as a result of being
substantially limited in a major life activity, are likely to face higher search
costs when looking for new employment.159
In sum, although eliminating all discussions related to disability and
accommodation may initially emerge as an obvious fix for the ADA, this fix is
likely to backfire and have unintended consequences. Shutting down
information flow between employers and employees about disability and
accommodation pre-offer would only serve to increase the uncertainty
surrounding whether a job candidate is a suitable match for a job. It may
further encourage employees to attempt to hide their disabilities pre-offer,
which could be viewed as deceptive behavior by their future employers and
undermine the employment relationship from the beginning. Finally,
banning conversations about disability and accommodation would be
particularly devastating for workers with visible disabilities, incapable of being
concealed, if they were unable to convey the nature and severity of their
limitations at the interview stage. For these reasons, a better fix to the ADA
will promote an increase in clarity of expectations. It will make explicit the
limits of the liability that an employer must incur, thus reducing the ambiguity
6
surrounding the costs of employing a disabled worker., o Such a solution,
intended to reduce employer ambiguity and promote betterjob matching, is
proposed in the following two Sections.
B.

BOUNDING ACCOMMODATION COSTS FOR EMPLOYERS

The results in Part IV indicate that employers are principally concerned
with the costs-both monetary and nonmonetary-of hiring and
accommodating a disabled worker. Yet as currently structured, the ADA
makes it quite difficult, if not impossible, for employers to estimate the costs
associated with employing a disabled worker.' 6 ' Consequently, an optimal fix

157.
See id. ("Very highly paid jobs and those at the senior or executive levels tend to have
").
disproportionately high turnover costs as a percentage of salary (up to 213 percent) ....
158.

See Steven J. Davis & Till von Wachter, Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss, BROOKINGS

PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 12-34 (201 1) (demonstrating thatjob displacement is associated with

substantial lifetime earnings losses, anxiety, and search costs).
Cf Baldwin & Marcus, The Impact of Mental and Substance-Use Disorders on Employment
159.
Transitions, supra note 136, at 336-40 (finding relatively high rates of transition between
unemployment, part-time work, and full-time work for individuals with mental illness and
substance use disorders).
Again, explicit bounds on employer costs will go far in reducing the uncertainty
16o.
associated with employing a disabled worker, regardless of how this uncertainty is characterized.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See supra Section H.A.
161.
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to the ADA will decrease the uncertainty surrounding the financial
responsibility to which employers are committing whenever they hire and
retain a worker with a disability. One way to reduce this cost ambiguity might
be to expand information flow, particularly at the hiring stage; a possible
approach might be to take the opposite stance of the one considered in the
last Section and allow employers to ask any and all questions they desire
regarding job applicants' disabilities. This approach is not ideal for two
reasons. First, to the extent that distaste for disability motivates employers,
legitimate concerns might arise regarding the reintroduction of unnecessary
bias into hiring decisions.,6 2 Second, and more importantly, for the reasons
discussed in Section II.A, allowing employers to ask more questions about the
health condition of ajob applicant might still result in employers' inability to
estimate the cost of accommodating that applicant with any accuracy.
Disabilities (and their underlying causes) vary tremendously in affected parts
of the body, duration, symptoms, and severity; even a note from an applicant's
physician may not always be able to predict how a disability will affect the
applicant in the long run.
Instead, a more straightforward, and likely more effective, way to reduce
the ambiguity surrounding workplace accommodation costs-and one that
avoids concerns about reintroducing opportunities for employer bias based
on distaste-is to place explicit limits on these costs. If employers knew the
maximum amount they would be required to spend to accommodate any
given worker, then the financial undertaking associated with employing a
disabled worker would be necessarily less ambiguous. With less ambiguity
should come less ambiguity aversion and, in turn, more willingness to hire
disabled workers on the part of employers.
An immediate question arises as to what these explicit bounds should be.
Courts have suggested under the current form of the ADA that the amount
an employer is required to spend should be determined at least in part by the
employer's size and financial resources.' 63 As long as employers are expected

162.
Although the experimental results presented in the prior Part suggest that the costs of
disability weigh more heavily on the minds of decisionmakers than distaste for disability,
legitimate concerns may still exist about the endurance of distaste for any historically
disadvantaged group, even if such distaste is less prevalent in the contemporary context. For
example, recall that experimental evidence suggests in the gender context, blinding employers
to the protected characteristic of gender results in better outcomes for disadvantaged women
o
when suspected bias based on distaste is at work. See Goldin & Rouse, supranote 15 , at 736-37.
Jessica Clarke has also recently documented the persistence of explicitly biased statements
-indicative
more of distaste than of statistical discrimination-being made against members of
historically disadvantaged groups. SeeJessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 1 13 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523
-47 (2o18).
163.
Courts have reached this conclusion when assessing the meaning of both reasonability
and undue hardship under the ADA (even though these issues are only mentioned in the statute
with respect to undue hardship in 42 U.S.C. § 121 11 (1o) (B) (2012)). See, e.g., Vande Zande v.
Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F. 3 d 538, 542-43 ( 7 th Cir. 1995).
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to bear accommodation costs without contribution from the employee,
employers' ability to support these costs remain a legitimate consideration.
One way to recognize that different size employers have different abilities to
finance accommodations, while keeping costs explicitly bounded, is to tier
employers' maximum accommodation expenditures by the number of
workers they employ. Already, compensatory and punitive damages are
6
capped under Title VII and the ADA in this manner., 4
Drawing on the experimental evidence presented in scenario two of Part
IV, subjects indicated that it was reasonable for a medium-size firm to pay
approximately $300 for an accommodation and to provide at least four weeks
of medical leave at half-pay. These figures provide a starting point for
legislators to define higher caps for larger employers and lower caps for
smaller employers. Nonetheless, future research must consider additional
issues-such as whether caps should vary based on underlying health
condition and employee tenure-in order to develop more precise and
workable accommodation cost caps.' 65 Nonetheless, even cost caps of a few
hundred dollars could go far in accommodating a substantial number of
disabled workers: JAN data suggest that accommodation cost caps reaching
$5oo for the largest firms would be sufficient to finance the accommodations
66
of over three-fourths of workers in need of one.,
Alternatively, legislators might define accommodation cost caps in terms
of the employee's value to the employer, as signified by the employee's salary.
Since an expensive accommodation may be a more worthwhile expenditure
on a high-value employee than on a low-value employee, defining the cost cap
as a percentage of the salary of the employee at issue could be sensible, if less
straightforward, than a cost cap defined by employer size. Yet since the goal
of reforming the reasonable accommodation model is to make it easier for
employers to determine their maximum financial responsibility associated
with employing a disabled worker, cost caps defined by employer size, rather
than employee value, may be more aligned with achieving the goals of clarity
and simplicity.' 67

164.

See 42 U.S.C. §

1981a(b) (3).

I plan to pursue such questions related to developing workable and effective
accommodation cost caps for employers in future experimental research.
j66. A 2015 Job Accommodation Network interview study of employers demonstrated that 58
percent of disability accommodations cost the employer nothing. Of the 42 percent of
accommodations that are cosly, the median employer expenditure is $5oo. See Loy, supra note 123.
167. Prior scholars have echoed this call to reform the ADA in a way that is more
straightforward to apply. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer's FinancialHardshipBecomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 391, 453 (1995) (advocating for reforms to the undue hardship analysis that are
"mathematically precise so that every covered employer and every employee will know the extent
of their obligations and entitlements in monetary terms"); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L.
Willborn, supra note 34, at 1281 (criticizing the inability of employers and employees to
determine "the precise extent of the employer's responsibility" under the current ADA). I also
165.
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If legislators introduce explicit accommodation cost caps into the ADA,
the question arises of how that cap will interact with the reasonability and
undue hardship analyses that have been so central to the reasonable
accommodation model, particularly in the long run. Determining whether an
accommodation is reasonable should still depend upon cost-benefit analysis

(as many prior courts have concluded) .'t Reasonable accommodations are
ones that maximize benefits while minimizing costs, and the benefits must
6
always outweigh the costs in order for an accommodation to be reasonable., 9
Rather, cost caps can best be conceptualized as modifying the undue hardship
analysis with respect to employers. A cost cap establishes a bright line rule that
any accommodation expenditure above a certain amount creates an undue
hardship for the employer.
This idea of explicitly capping how much employers must spend on
accommodation was circulated in the early years of the ADA,17o even ifit has
been largely forgotten by scholars in recent years.'7' Indeed, the legislative
history of the Act reveals that two employer cost-cap amendments were
proposed during House committee debates,172 and another similar
amendment was proposed by Representative James Olin during the House
floor debate.73 In fact, during the floor debate, Representative Olin
prophetically pled with his colleagues, "[W]e need something tangible. We
should not be passing laws .that affect almost all businessmen in this country
where the proprietor of that business does not know what he needs to do to
abide by the law. It is a big mistake." 74 Despite this plea, all three amendments
ultimately failed.'75 The reason that the cost-cap amendments failed-and the

plan to explore this issue of factoring employee value into accommodation cost caps in future
experimental research.
168. See, e.g., Vande Zande, 44 F.3 d at 543 (holding that "[t] he employee must show that the
accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs");
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F. 3 d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring that, to be
reasonable, "an accommodation[] [must have] costs ... which, facially, do not clearly exceed its
benefits"); see also Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc.,

244 F. 3 d 254, 259--60 (1st Cir. 2001)

(suggesting that courts must weight costs and benefits for both the reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship analyses).
169.
See sources cited supra note 168.
170.
See, e.g., Olin Amendment to the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, 136 Cong. Rec.
at H2 4

75

(daily ed. May 17, 1990).

171.
In fact, despite the multiple scholarly proposals in recent years to extend the reasonable
accommodation model beyond workers with a disability, these scholars have not considered how
this model may need to first be reformed. For a discussion of these recent scholarly proposals,
see supra notes I 17-2o and accompanying text.

172.
See 136 Cong. Rec. H2 3 17 (daily ed. May 15, 199o) (recording the failure of a cost-cap
amendment "by a wide margin" in the House Education and Labor Committee); House Judiciary
Committee Vote No. 477 (May 1,199o) (recording a failure of a cost-cap amendment by 14 votes).
7 5 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).

173.

See 136 Cong. Rec. at H2

174.

Id.
See id.(recording that the House floor amendment failed by 26 votes); supra note

175.

4

172.
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reason that scholars have largely shied away from resurrecting them'76-has
always stemmed from the concern that they would shut a large number of
disabled workers out of the labor market.' 77
Imagine, for example, a worker with a hearing impairment. Equipping
worker
with a hearing-impaired telephone and computer software could
that
easily exceed $i ,ooo-more than three times the amount that subjects were
willing to spend on an accommodation in scenario two of the experiment in
Part IV. If Congress modified the ADA to impose a bright-line accommodation
cost cap of a few hundred dollars, then paying for this worker's
accommodation would always, by definition, constitute an undue hardship for
employers.',7 Without more, the end result of such an amendment would be
the complete exclusion of this worker from the labor market-even if the
worker were a highly skilled employee who could generate hundreds of
thousands of dollars in annual revenue. Not only would this end result be
inefficient from an economic perspective, it would also be inconsistent with
the underlying goal of the ADA to end the "dependency and nonproductivity"
that results from shutting disabled workers out of the labor market.79 Thus,
avoiding this end result for workers in need of expensive accommodations
requires a supplement to employer cost caps; such a supplement is proposed
in the next Section.

176. One notable exception is Steven B. Epstein, who recognized the need for a bright-line
standard early in the Act's history and advocated for a reconsideration of the Olin Amendment.
See Epstein, supra note 167, at 478 (arguing that "a highly transparent and highly accessible
standard" is needed to remedy "[t]he fundamental shortcomings of the currently vague undue
hardship standard").
177.

See, e.g., Schwab & Willborn, supra note 34, at 1276-83 (raising the concern that

disabled workers may be forced to take less productive jobs that merely require a cheap
accommodation, when they could be doing a more productive job that requires expensive
accommodations); Verkerke, supra note 14, at 943-44, 947 (giving an example of an attorney
with dyslexia who requires an expensive accommodation but would be very productive with such
an accommodation).
178. One concern that might emerge from the solution proposed in this Section is the ability
of Congress to amend the ADA, given current partisan tensions and recent record-breaking
government shutdown. This concern may be overstated in the context of disability legislation,
which has historically enjoyed support from both Republicans and Democrats (both the 199o
ADA and the 2oo8 ADAAA, for instance, were passed during Republican presidencies).
Nonetheless, an alternative-and easier to implement-reform might be for the EEOC to instead
issue guidance establishing assumptions that employer expenditures on accommodation in
excess of the cost caps were undue (unless the plaintiff could prove otherwise). A legislative
solution would be strongly preferable, however, since such guidance would arguably exceed the
EEOC's rulemaking authority under the ADA and, thus, not be entitled to deference under
Chevron., U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci lnc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). A legislative

solution is also necessary to implement the second part of this proposal, outlined in Section V.C.
179.

42 U.S.C. § 121o1(a) (8) (2o12); accord Epstein, supra note 167, at 478 ("Unnecessary

acrimony and potential litigation would be avoided, and a well-qualified person with a disability
would be put to work. This result is exactly what Title I was intended to achieve.").
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SUPPLEMENTINGACCOMMODATION COSTS FOREMPI QYFES

An explicit bound on accommodation costs should reduce the ambiguity
associated with employing a disabled worker under the ADA and, in turn,
reduce employers' aversion toward this ambiguity. And with less aversion
towards employing disabled workers should at last come better labor market
outcomes for them. Although this Article is the first to pinpoint the
underlying ambiguity perpetuated by the ADA (and resulting employer
aversion) as the Act's fatal flaw, it is not the first to argue that the seemingly
boundless accommodation costs faced by employers may result in unintended
consequences. In 1996, for example, the members of the Harvard Law Review
asserted that the ADA "would be easier for employers to follow if the
standards, particularly 'reasonable accommodation' and 'undue hardship,'
were defined more precisely.", s
Still, scholars have been largely reluctant to propose a bright-line cost
limit for employers out of concern that such limits would foreclose labor
market opportunities for individuals who require expensive accommodations.
Instead, scholars like Stewart Schwab, Steven Willborn,' 1, andJ.H. Verkerke' 8 2
have advocated for alternative models like cost-sharing, in which both
employers and employees bear the cost of workplace accommodation
(instead of employers bearing the entire expense). Under the cost-sharing
model, legal scholars have argued, employers will no longer need to be so
nervous about undertaking the highly uncertain, and potentially enormous,
costs associated with employing a disabled worker; the cost-sharing model will
consequently unlock additional labor-market opportunities, particularly for
workers in need of significant accommodations. 8 3 This cost-sharing model
may work for highly skilled employees in need of an expensive
accommodation.J.H. Verkerke, for example, offers the example of a dyslexic
attorney who requires an accommodation that is so expensive, it would
necessarily create an undue hardship for any law firm., 84 In this instance, both
the attorney and society may be better off if she were allowed to share the
accommodation cost with her law firm so that (1) the cost would not create
an undue hardship for the firm, and (2) the attorney would not be forced to
work in a lower-skill job or, worse yet, be foreclosed from working
altogether.'85
The problem with the cost-sharing model is that it would likely prove
infeasible for low-skill workers. A disabled attorney may be able to contribute
money toward an expensive workplace accommodation, but a disabled worker

i8o.

Employment Discrimination, 1o9 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1615 (1996).

181.

Schwab & Willborn, supra note 34, at 120 1.

182.

Verkerke, supra note 14, at 955.

183.

See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 34, at 1276-83; Verkerke, supra note 14, at 945-48.

184.

See Verkerke, supra note 14, at 943-44, 947 (discussing this example).

185.

See id.
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living paycheck to paycheck will not. Return to the example from the last
Section of a worker with a hearing impairment who requires $1,000 worth of
special computer and telephone equipment. If that worker is a computer
programmer earning $ioo,ooo per year, then the worker could easily share
the cost of the necessary equipment with her employer. On the other hand, if
that worker is a receptionist making $20,000 per year, then such equipment
could cost her weeks' worth of paychecks.
Prior scholarly proposals have ignored or dismissed this concern,,86
principally on the grounds that high-cost accommodations may only make
sense for high-value employees. 8 7 Yet there is reason to be concerned that
cost-sharing is not a workable solution for a significant number of disabled
8
individuals. Individuals with a disability have lower educational attainments, 8
8
and are more likely to live in poverty, 9 than individuals without a disability.
Thus, even if allowed to cost-share with their employers, many disabled
individuals may still not be able to afford such an option. Moreover, empirical
evidence suggests that, even under the current ADA, higher-skilled disabled
workers already face fewer barriers in the labor market than lower-skilled
disabled workers because of higher-skilled workers' ability to self-finance
coping technologies.190
For these reasons, the better proposal is for the government, not workers,
to supplement high-cost accommodations. This idea of using government
money to fund workplace accommodations is not entirely novel; at least one

186.
Schwab and Willborn, for example, seem to suggest that the only reason a disabled
worker may choose not to cost share is if she did not believe the financial risk of contributing to
a workplace accommodation was worth the financial reward of the job itself. See Schwab &
Willborn, supranote 34, at 1279-8o ("Assume, for example, an individual with a disability who is
presented with two jobs, one quite desirable, but requiring an expensive accommodation, and
another less desirable, but requiring an inexpensive and clearly reasonable accommodation....
The option of paying for the portion of the accommodation costs above the reasonable level
would allow the individual to pursue the desirable job at lower risk. She could agree to pay the
potentially extra-reasonable portion of the accommodation costs and thus ensure access to the
betterjob. At a cost that the individual with a disability determines to be reasonable (otherwise
she would not pay it and opt instead for the less desirable job), the rule permits her to apply for
a more desirable job that maximizes the reasonable accommodation the employer must make."
(citation omitted)).
187.
See, e.g., Verkerke, supra note 14, at 947 ("An arrangement to share accommodation
costs would be especially appropriate when a person's disability creates significant obstacles to
becoming highly productive in her chosen occupation.").
188.
See DANIELLE M. TAYLOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2014, at
13 (2018), available al https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/
2018/demo/p70-152.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 5 RAJ-XJSR] ("In general, adults with a disability
had a lower level of educational attainment than adults without a disability.").
189.
See BRAULT, supra note i 14, at tbl.D-8; see als'o TAYLOR, supra note 188, at 14 (referring
to tbl. 5 ).
19o.
See David M. Cutler et. al., How Do the Better Educated Do It? Socioeconomic Status and Ability
to Cope with Underlying Impairment, in DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 203, 237-38
(David A. Wise ed., 2oo9).
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article has previously proposed creating a federal grant program to fund
workplace accommodations.'91 What is novel about the present proposal,
however, is the idea of expanding current disability entitlement programs to
fund expensive accommodations in the workplace. On both the state and
federal levels, disability entitlement programs already exist, but they are
focused entirely on supporting disabled individuals while they are unable to
work. The federal program focuses on individuals who are unable to work in
the long-term,192 and state programs focus on individuals who are unable to
work in the short-term.'93 Such programs could be expanded to support
disabled individuals who are able to work, but who require accommodations
that cost more than the employer accommodation caps proposed in the prior
Section.
Expanding the scope of disability entitlement programs to fund
workplace accommodations may or may not make these programs more
expensive for a government in the long run. On the one hand, this proposal
involves a new form of entitlement-providing workplace accommodations
-which is not free. On the other hand, funding workplace accommodations
may allow some individuals who have been previously shut out of the labor
market to go back to work and to cease relying on disability entitlements for
their living expenses. Along these lines, this proposal is consistent with the
original purposes of the ADA, which include empowering a group of
individuals long disenfranchised from the labor market because of their
health status, as well as reducing this group's dependence on the social
security rolls.' 94

Funding for high-cost accommodation supplements could derive from
the same source of existing federal and state disability entitlement programs:
a payroll tax., 95 Current payroll taxes may need to increase somewhat to fund

191.
See Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public FundingforDisabilityAccommodations: A
Rational Solution to RationalDiscriminationand the Disabilitiesof the ADA, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
197, 199 (1998).
192.
See Disability Benefits, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/disability
[https://perma.cc/HC7T-K6 3 S] ("Social Security pays disability benefits to people who can't work

because they have a medical condition that's expected to last at least one year or result in death.").
193. For an in-depth exploration of state disability programs, see Shinall, The Pregnancy
Penalty, supra note i , at 8o9-1 2. See also State Family and Medical Leave Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 19, 2o16), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/statefamily-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/26HJ-UVRX].
194.

See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE LJ. 1, 5 (2004)

(noting that the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts were initially motivated by the social welfare model,
which advocated helping the disabled); Samuel Issacharoff &Justin Nelson, Discriminationwith a
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79
N.C. L. REV. 307, 309-11 (2oo) (arguing that the redistributive norm is inherent in the ADA);

Wax, supranote 14, at 1425-26 (arguing that part of the ADA's purpose was to reduce the burden
on the public rolls).
195. Federal and state programs differ in how much of the disability program payroll tax
burden they levy on employers versus employees. Compare the federal Social Security payroll tax
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the new government accommodation supplement program, but at least some
of the additional supplement program cost would be offset by the fact that
more disabled individuals could reenter the labor market and contribute
payroll taxes themselves. Furthermore, governmental programs to
supplement the cost of high-cost accommodations come with an additional
benefit: A third-party to the employment relationship (the government)
makes the determination as to whether the employee's desired
accommodation is reasonable and worth funding. Currently, the reasonable
accommodation model leaves this determination in the hands of employers,
even though employers have incentives to minimize costs in a way that may
cloud their ability to make a fairjudgment. Requiring disabled individuals to
apply to the government for an accommodation supplement-much in the
way that disabled individuals already apply for disability entitlement
programs-ensures that a more disinterested party outside the employeremployee relationship will determine whether the proposed accommodation
maximizes benefits while minimizing costs.
One final potential model to consider when structuring a disability
accommodation supplement program is workers' compensation insurance,
which is required for employers to carry in virtually all states and covers the
cost of workplace injuries.,96 Similarly, a requirement that employers carry
disability accommodation insurance might serve to cover excess
accommodation costs in the workplace. In my future research, I intend to
consider all of the above models in greater depth with the goal of developing
a more precise vision of a disability accommodation supplement program
-one which relies on all available evidence from existing governmental
benefit programs to identify best practices regarding who should fund the
program, how the program should be funded, who should administer the
program, and how the program should be administered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Extending the reasonable accommodation model beyond disabled
individuals has served as a popular proposal for legal scholars in recent
years,,97 in spite of multiple empirical studies suggesting that the model is
flawed.,9 8 Still, it is hard to blame legal scholars for wanting to export this

burden (equally shared by employers and employees) with the Rhode Island and California
disability payroll tax burden (borne entirely by employees). See Shinall, The Pregnancy Penalty,
supra note i i, at8 11-1i2.

196. Texas is the well-known exception here, allowing employers to opt-out of buying
workers' compensation insurance. For empirical evidence regarding the employers who opt out
(and the consequences of opting out), see generally Alison Morantz, Opting Out of Workers'
Compensation in Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in REGULATION VERSUS
LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 197 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011 ).
See supraPart I.
197.

198.

See supraSection II.A.
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model to assist other populations. The need for greater accommodations in
the workplace is clear for pregnant women, parents, caretakers, and people
with nondisabling health conditions, among others;'99 such individuals
continue to have persistently poor labor market outcomes at least in part
because traditional, inflexible workplaces are not appropriately built for
them.2° Because the reasonable accommodation model has remained the
dominant paradigm for accommodating workers over the last few decades, it
is hardly surprising that scholars would turn to this paradigm as a solution for
other workers in need of accommodation.
Yet exporting a flawed model to other populations is likely to result in
the same disappointing outcomes already seen with the disabled population:
a lack of labor market progress. As a result, this Article argues that the ADA
must be reformed, not just for disabled individuals, but for anyone who may
benefit from legislatively mandated accommodation in the future. 2 °" This part
of the argument is not new, particularly for economists, who have insisted for
years that the reasonable accommodation model is inherently problematic.202
What is new within this Article is the two-part, data-driven scheme outlining
how the ADA should be reformed.203

Insufficient data have previously left empiricists unable to suggest
empirically grounded reforms to the ADA. With the help of two experimental
vignette studies, this Article generates these missing data in order to pinpoint
when, how, and why the ADA is not serving disabled individuals. Principally,
the studies indicate that decisionmakers' concerns about the costs associated
with accommodating a disabled worker may be difficult for such workers to
overcome at the hiring stage, but not after they are already employed.204 The

disparate results between job candidates and existing employees may be
reconciled by the greater level of ambiguity associated with workers (and their
disabilities) at the hiring stage-ambiguity which the current ADA only serves
to increase.
Consequently, reforms to the reasonable accommodation model must
begin in ways that reassure employers that they will not be subject to seemingly

199.

See supra notes 117-2o and accompanying text.

Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability Paradigm of Sex
Discrimination,79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1297, 1314-15 (2oo8) (discussing how work environments
have been traditionally built for men); see also Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last
Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REV. o91, 1 i8 (2014) ("[R]apidly growing sectors of the economy and
200.

newer industries and occupations, such as those in health and information technologies, appear
to be moving in the direction of more flexibility and greater linearity of earnings with respect to
time worked. The last chapter needs other sectors to follow their lead.").

For example, pregnant women are already being accommodated under the ADA
201.
reasonable accommodation model in several states. SeeWidiss, supra note 1,at 1452-53 (making
note of these laws).
202.

See supra Section I.A.

203.

See supra Sections V.B, V.C.

204.

See supra Part IV.
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unbounded costs if they hire a disabled worker. Moreover, these reforms must
focus on decisionmaking points when employers need such reassurances
most-as suggested here, the hiring stage-so that employers can henceforth
anticipate accommodation with greater certainty. Without such ambiguityreducing reforms, the reasonable accommodation model will remain
incapable of improving labor market outcomes of disabled individuals, or of
anyone else, in the labor market.
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APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1. Variations of Scenario One (Leave Scenario)
Candidate

Candidate

Candidate

Candidate

One Name

Two Name

One Health

Two Health

3
4
5
6
7

Amanda
Amanda
Amanda
Amanda
Amanda
Amanda
Amanda

Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer

Condition
None
Pregnant
None
Pregnant
Hip surgery
Hip surgery
Hip surgery

8

Amanda

Jennifer

Pregnant

9

Amanda

Jennifer

None

10

12
13

Amanda
Amanda
Amanda
Amanda

Michael
Michael
Michael
Michael

None
Pregnant
Hip surgery
Hip surgery

Condition
None
None
Pregnant
Pregnant
None
Pregnant
Knee
surgery
Knee
surgery
Knee
surgery
None
None
None
Knee
surgery

14

Amanda

Michael

Pregnant

15

Amanda

Michael

None

16
18
19

Christopher
Christopher
Christopher
Christopher

Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer
Jennifer

None
Hip surgery
Hip surgery
Hip surgery

20

Christopher

Jennifer

None

21
22
23
24

Christopher
Christopher
Christopher
Christopher

Jennifer
Michael
Michael
Michael

None
None
Hip surgery
None

25

Christopher

Michael

Hip surgery

Variation

1
2

11

17

Knee
surgery
Knee
surgery
None
None
Pregnant
Knee
surgery
Knee
surgery
Pregnant
None
None
Knee
surgery
Knee
surgery
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Appendix Table 2. Variations of Scenario Two (Chair
Accommodation Scenario)
Candidate One
Health
Condition
None
Pregnancy
weight
None

2

Candidate
One
Name
Melissa
Melissa

Candidate
Two
Name
Sarah
Sarah

3

Melissa

Sarah

4

Melissa

Sarah

5
6

Melissa
Melissa

Sarah
Sarah

7
8

Melissa
Melissa

Sarah
Sarah

9
1o
11

Melissa
Melissa
Melissa

Sarah
David
David

12

1
14

Melissa
Melissa
Melissa

David
David
David

15
16
17
18

Melissa
Daniel
Daniel
Daniel

David
Sarah
Sarah
Sarah

Weight
Pregnancy
weight
None
None
Pregnancy
weight
Weight
Weight
Pregnancy
weight
None
None
Weight
Weight

19

Daniel
Daniel
Daniel

Sarah
Sarah
Sarah

Weight
None
None

Daniel
Daniel
Daniel
Daniel

David
David
David
David

None
Weight
None
Weight

Variation

I

20
21

22

23
24

25

Pregnancy
weight
Weight
Weight

Candidate Two
Health
Condition
None
None
Pregnancy
weight
Pregnancy
weight
None
Pregnancy
weight
Weight
Weight
Weight
None
None
None
Weight
Weight
Weight
None
None
Pregnancy
weight
Weight
Weight
Pregnancy
weight
None
None
Weight
Weight
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Appendix Table 3. Average Willingness to Provide Accommodation, by
Subjects' Demographic Characteristics
QuestinQuesu
Pregnant Candidate
Surgery Candidate

tion 2
Unspecified
Weight
Candidate
Price of
Desk Chair

Pregnancy
Weight
Candidate
Price of
Desk
Chair

Subject
Pool

Number
of
Weeks
of Leave

Percentage
of Pay
During
Leave

Number
of
Weeks
of Leave

Percentage
of Pay
During
Leave

All

4.44

56.72%

6.44

62.74%

$315.27

$305.32

4.52

56.53%

6.65

63.09%

$321.72

$307.65

4.49

58.07%

6.56

62.24%

$325.51

$313.26

4.53

52.68%

7.13

59.85%

$310.75

$283.08

4-48

53.73%

6.84

61.8o%

$312.34

$295.68

4.49

55.L L%

6.24

62.67%

$326.42

$305.02

Subjects
Hiring

Experience
Ever Been

Disabled
Ever Been

Pregnant
Has

Children
Obese
(BMI> 3 o)

